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The Department of the Navy (DoN) maintains an inventory of Small Tactical Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (STUAS). These systems are designed for payload modularity to 
support user selection of multiple mission configurations in order to meet any unique 
mission need. Numerous mission ready payloads have been developed for each system, 
and only need to be integrated in order to become part of the fielded unmanned aerial 
system (UAS) configuration. Unfortunately, the DoN does not have a method that 
maintains sufficient systems engineering (SE) discipline to rapidly integrate and field 
new mission configurations to the fleet in support of aggressive schedules and urgent user 
needs. The typical fielding time frame can range from 24 to 36 months, instead of the 
desired 6 to 18 months. Furthermore, without a sufficient SE approach, risk to mission 
success is not well understood. This paper captures all applicable requirements for 
fielding a new capability onto an existing UAS, and using an SE approach, outlines a 
process to rapidly integrate payloads DoN system. The process identified provides a 
comprehensive list of integration requirements; a cost, schedule, and performance trade-
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The Department of the Navy (DoN) does not have a method that maintains sufficient 
systems engineering (SE) discipline to rapidly integrate and field new mission 
configurations into its fleet of Small Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems (STUAS) in 
support of aggressive schedules and urgent user needs. Furthermore, without a sufficient 
SE approach, risk to mission success is not well understood. The DoN Small Tactical 
Unmanned Aerial Systems (STUAS) are designed for payload modularity to support 
user-selection of multiple mission configurations in order to meet any unique mission 
needs. Numerous mission ready payloads have been developed for each system, and only 
need to be integrated in order to become part of the fielded UAS configuration. The 
typical fielding time frame of a new payload can range from 24 to 36 months, instead of 
the desired 6 to 18 months.  
 This paper captures all applicable requirements for fielding a new capability onto 
an existing UAS, and using a SE approach, outlines a process to rapidly integrate 
payloads. An outcome of this report was the creation of a new Rapid Transition Process 
(RTP) that can be used in the transition of any new technology. NAVAIR has a lot of 
separate procedures which apply to the fielding and transition of technologies to the fleet 
or warfighter, but a process to bring all of the procedures together in an orderly and 
efficient manner does not exist. To determine the best implementation of this process a 
detailed SE analysis was conducted of the current payload integration process. This 
analysis resulted in a stream lined integration process, identified in Figure that provides 
stakeholders the ability to trade cost schedule and performance, while managing risk, in 




Figure 1:  RAIN Project Rapid Transition Process Streamlined Integration 
 
 The process provides a comprehensive list of system level integration 
requirements, a cost, schedule, and performance trade off analysis, risk assessments 
associated with each tradeoff option, and a recommendation on to how best support a 
rapid fielding timeline. The options are to pursue full certifications, pursue certification 
subjected to a low risk timeline reduction (LRTR) strategy, and pursue certifications 
subject to an intermediate risk timeline reduction (IRTR) strategy. The LRTR strategy 
involves using previously certified subsystems in the payload to bypass certifications that 
drive the schedule, CAT 3 flight certification, and joint DT and OT. The IRTR strategy 
involves the use of interim certifications for the ones among the schedule drivers that 
allow them, a CAT 3 flight certification, and shifting OT to initial fielding. During the 
tradeoff analysis three potential payloads where reviewed, a LASER Designator payload, 
a Passive Electronic Warfare payload, and an Active Electronic Warfare payload. The 
requirements for each payload were identified, and can be seen in Figure 1. The tradeoff 
analysis identified three options to execute payload integration, complex payload 
 xxiii 
 
integration, simple payload integration, and highly mature payload integration. Under 
each option three scenarios where modeled, to include full certification (BL), low risk 
timeline reduction (LRTR), and intermediate risk timeline reduction (IRTR), details are 
shown in Figure 3. Based on these options and scenarios, a range of rapid integration 
possibilities has been identified. Each possibility provides an assessment of risk 
acceptance, allowing tailoring of a detailed SE process to fit cost and schedule 
constraints, while maintaining sufficient SE 
The RTP was designed to streamline the current disjointed integration approach 
employed by the PMA in fielding a new payload combination on a modular STUAS 
through early identification of the complete set of required certifications. It will also 
support a rapid fielding decision by providing the steps needed to pursue full or interim 
certifications. This was done by performing the RTP functions show in Figure 2 with the 
assistance of physical components in the form of checklists; certification requirements 
listings by system type; timeline reduction options listings, descriptions, and ratings; 
simulation results for cost and schedule for following certification baseline or timeline 
reduction strategies and was comprised of the seven (7) steps that follow  
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2:  Rapid Transition Process Functional Flow 
 
Step 1: Initiation of the RTP by the PMA 
Step 2: Determine Certifications to Pursue 
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Step 3: Collect Certification Data:  Perform iteratively with analyzing the certification 
data. 
Step 4: Analyze Certification Data: Perform iteratively with collecting the certification 
data. 
Step 5: Address Risk 
Step 6: Develop Certification Package for Decision Maker 
RTP Conclusion 
The RTP ends when fielding decision package is judged to be complete by the 




Figure 3:  STUAS Payload Requirements 
(Red=Certification Required, Green/Blue=Certification Not Required) 
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The results of the trade study produced a number of possible options for payload 
integration. Each options risk was identified, allowing stakeholders to make an educated 
decision, as to whether a specific option can meet timelines, while maintaining sufficient 
SE rigor to ensure risks are understood and mitigated. The summary of the results can be 
seen in Figure 4, Figure 5, Figure 6 and Figure 7 based on risk tolerance levels if this 
processes was utilized a payload integration can be conducted to meet a range of users 
needs with a sound cost, schedule, and performance balance. 
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Figure 5:   Cost Summary Results 
 









The RAIN Team would like to acknowledge the following people for contribution and 
aid to this capstone project: 
 
  
Wayne Parsons Dr. Jennifer Prentice Kelly Frome 
Michael Martines David Ince Reginald Fagin 
Stephanie Brown Stuart Peterson Corinne Dockstader 
Alex Rivera Steve Metcalf Bruce Smith 
John Gernand Pamela Crispell Joseph Ferguson 
Benjamin Teich William Pugh Vincent Tolbert 
Son Tran Ronald Lyliston Kenneth Harmon 
Andrew Miller Susan Gregg William Hasagawa 
Adam Farnsworth Tim Hickey Jay Eggler 
Judy Butler-Kowalik Margil Rodriguiz Dr. Paul Montgomery 
Dr. Rama Gehris Prof. Bonnie Young Bridgette Kwinn 
Leslie Jue Kam Hoi Milton Gabaldon 
 Lisa Barneby  
   
 xxx 
 




I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. Problem Background 
The Department of the Navy (DoN) maintains a relatively small inventory of 
Small Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems (STUAS). These systems are designed to be 
highly modular and support multiple configurations, allowing for user selection of 
payloads based on unique mission needs. This modularity reduces the necessity for 
multiple unique Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) platforms and their associated life 
cycle costs, while still providing mission flexibility. Technology developers are 
successful in designing new payloads which integrate into the UAS platform and meet 
mission requirements. This provides a payload technology that is at a suitable 
Technology Readiness Level (TRL); meets all technical requirements of the applicable 
UAS Interface Control Document(s) (ICD); and size, weight, and power (SWAP) 
requirements. Typically, while the requirements with regard to the specific payload-
vehicle interface are met, the payload developers do not address the DoN System-level 
requirements for integration and fielding.  
It is the responsibility of the system’s integrator to ensure that the platform, with 
its new payload, meets all regulatory and statutory requirements for deployment to the 
fleet. This is done by obtaining the necessary technical certifications (e.g., laser, Li 
battery, airworthiness approvals, for instance) imposed by regulatory requirements on the 
systems. An example of a statutory requirement placed on UAVs that must be addressed 
for successful integration is H.R1815 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2006 (HR Bill 2005), which states all data links used by a UAV must use the 
government-developed Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL). This particular example 
has caused challenges in the past because some payloads are developed with their own 
Command and Control (C2) data links so they do not have to integrate with the existing 
UAS data links, reducing the complexity of payload level integration. Unfortunately, not 
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meeting the TCDL requirement requires re-engineering of the payload to complete 
systems-level integration, causing delays in fielding. 
2. UAS History 
The early history of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) began with Perley’s aerial 
bomber in 1863 and Eddy’s surveillance kite in 1898. During the American Civil War the 
inventor Charles Perley obtained a patent for his design of a hot air balloon known as the 
unmanned aerial bomber which could carry a heavy load of explosives with a timer. 
Because weather conditions and air currents made it hard to estimate the time to set the 
fuse his design proved to be inaccurate and unreliable. By 1898 the first military aerial 
surveillance photos were taken during the Spanish-American War using a kite with a long 
string attached to the shutter release of the camera.  
Although those two (2) early inventions, using primitive Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (UAV) technology, achieved very limited success, they had attracted attention 
because of their promise for wartime applications in covering areas considered to be too 
dangerous and inaccessible to be overflown by manned reconnaissance aircraft. Growing 
from original concepts, flying bombs and pilotless drone aircraft such as the Kettering 
Aerial Torpedo  
Figure 1) built in the 1910s during World War I became the precursors to modern-
day cruise missiles. Most of them were jet-propelled and low- flying, mostly gliding to 
the intended target. In some cases they were guided to its target by a simple on-board 
computer. The development of such weaponry brought UAV technology to the next level 




Figure 1:  Kettering Aerial Torpedo in the 1910s (18 NOVA 2013)  
 
By World War II, numerous unmanned craft were built around the world. 
However, it was not until the 1930s that the U.S. Navy started its initial experiments with 
unmanned aerial aircraft controlled by radio signals. One outcome of these endeavors 
was the Curtiss N2C-2 biplane drone, which flew for the first time without a pilot in late 
1937. During the last days of the Second World War, Germany’s invention of the V-1 
flying bomb (also known as buzz bomb or doodlebug) made new progress in UAV 
history by demonstrating its significant potential during combat. This pilotless 
monoplane carrying a 2000-pound warhead was a pulse-jet-powered predecessor of the 
modern cruise missiles and rockets launched from the ground (ground-to-air missiles). It 
was not radio-controlled, but pre-programmed to fly 150 miles before dropping its bomb, 
causing catastrophic damage (18 NOVA 2013). The development of such a deadly 
weapon convinced the U.S. military to lay more extensive groundwork on post-war UAV 
programs (Bone and Bolkcom 2003).  
During the Vietnam and Korean wars, UAVs gained more credibility and made 
further inroads into American and allied military programs. The American armed forces 
became more involved in maturing their own technology and influenced their allies to do 
so as well. Investing time, knowledge, and money in high-technology weapons became a 
trend in the international community (11 Wikipedia 2013). By the late 1950s, military 
aircraft were already capable of travelling at speeds of Mach 2. Building upon the success 
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of UAVs as targets, the U.S. military started to take increasing advantage of UAS 
potential to achieve other previously unachievable and hazardous missions. This 
expansion brought about the development of the UAVs with the capability to accomplish 
missions through remote control.   
In 1960 the U.S. Air Force launched its first stealth-technology aircraft and began 
modifying the war-fighting UAVs to achieve a new mission: reconnaissance. The earlier 
jet-propelled, subsonic target drone BQM-34A (formerly designated Q-2C Firebee) was 
turned into the AQM-34L reconnaissance drone for long-range reconnaissance, 
undercover surveillance, and leaflet-dropping missions in Vietnam and other parts of 
Southeast Asia. One of the most critical surveillance missions of Firebee was radar 
detection of surface-to-air missiles over China and North Vietnam (18 NOVA 2013). 
Because of its accomplishment, Firebee received further attention and recognition for 
national security in the armed forces. Military strategists discovered the UAV’s flexibility 
and started searching for ways to maximize its potential. Ultimately, the Firebee was 
reformed to deliver payloads, conducting its very first flight test on December 20th, 2002 
as an armed UAV (Bone and Bolkcom 2003).  
In 1965, the single high-speed and ultra-stealth D-21 UAV developed for 
photographic aerial reconnaissance by Lockheed with a maximum range of 3,000 miles, 
to operate at a height of 80,000 feet and the ability to follow a preprogrammed path. This 
Mach-4 aircraft was carried on the back of a manned Lockheed M-12 Blackbird variant 
aircraft and considered to be the fastest UAV developed to date. However, the D-21 
project was shelved because of its catastrophic failures (18 NOVA 2013) in all of the four 
(4) operational missions. The failures prompted the U.S. military to develop new UAVs 
suited for intelligence gathering at high altitude and out of range of hostile missiles, 
resulting in the invention of the Ryan Special Purpose Aircraft or SPA 147 (18 NOVA 
2013).  
In the late 1970s the Israelis developed several UAVs, such as the Scout, which 
were eventually operated in Lebanon in 1982. With its low radar signature and small size, 
the Scout was almost impossible to shoot down. This new successful UAV technology 
impressed U.S. observers, causing them to establish a joint development of UAVs and 
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marked the beginning of the evolution of experimental projects into actual acquisition 
programs (Bone and Bolkcom 2003). A rocket-boosted UAV that took off from runways 
on land or carrier flight decks known as Pioneer (Figure 2) was one of the resultant joint 
developments. To this day Pioneer is still being utilized to confirm high priority mobile 
targets using the Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) from other aircraft (18 NOVA 2013). 
 
Figure 2:  Pioneer and its parts (From Pioneer UAV 2002) 
 
After recognizing the significance of UAVs, several countries, with the U.S. in 
the forefront, ushered in a proliferation of UAV innovations in the 1990s, including many 
impressive capabilities that were far more advanced than their precursors. This led to the 
development of the General Atomics MQ-1 Predator (Figure 3), a medium-altitude, long-
endurance UAV, is probably one of the most sophisticated in the U.S. military arsenal. 
The Predators were innovative as they were able to be configured to complete multiple 
missions from a single platform. By carrying cameras, sensors, and munitions, the 
primary capabilities of Predator are conducting armed reconnaissance and fulfilling 




Figure 3:  RQ-1/MQ-1  Predator (18 NOVA 2013) 
 
Over the last 100 years, manned canvas-over-wood biplane aircraft have turned 
into entirely autonomous advanced aerial systems with the capabilities of achieving all 
types of battlefield roles, including but not limited to: cargo transportation, at-sea or in-
flight replenishment, surveillance, data and photo collection, and target acquisition and 
engagement. Instead of using manned aircraft, those missions are now mostly 
accomplished around the world through both fixed-wing, and more recently, rotary-wing 
aircraft UAVs. The size and capabilities of the systems range from large vehicles that can 
carry offensive weapons to a miniature system used for surveillance that can be carried in 
a backpack. With existing technology, a UAV can be operated as a stand-alone unit or as 
part of a system of systems known as a UAS. For instance, the RQ-7 Shadow UAS is 
comprised of four (4) unmanned aerial (UAS), two (2) Ground Control Stations (GCSs), 
a portable GCS, a Launcher, two Ground Data Terminals (GDTs), a portable GDT, a 
Remote Video Terminal, and other related equipment. In addition, military units are also 
fielded with a maintenance support vehicle. 
Anxious to take advantage of incredible potential of such weapons systems, 
countries around the world are continually pouring in resources, money, and 
technological investments into UAS-related programs. Currently, the five (5) most 
common UAVs of the United States Department of Defense are: Predator and Global 
Hawk of the Air Force; Pioneer of the Navy and Marine Corps; and Hunter and Shadow 
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of the Army (Bone and Bolkcom 2003). The countries known to possess UAVs are 
China, France, Germany, Greece, India, Israel, Iran, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Pakistan, South 
Africa, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States (Multiple 
and Wikipedia). Only recently have UASs expanded their critical nature in combat 
missions, not only because of technological sophistication but also due to perceived 
military requirements to fulfill national objectives. International crises are believed to be 
the driving forces for enhancement of war-fighting capabilities. In the future it is 
anticipated that UASs will play a crucial role in the world’s conflicts. 
B. CURRENT INTEGRATION PROCESS FOR MODULAR PAYLOADS 
 
Figure 4:  Current Operational View (Before the RTP process) 
 
The transition process between integration of the payload into the target platform 
and its ultimate integration into the encompassing DoN System is not well-defined. Each 
DoN System level requirement is handled independently by a different organization 
within the government where the knowledge of that particular process and its associated 
requirements is typically self-contained. To date, little effort has been made to take a 
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system level approach to bridge those lines of communication between organizations (as 
shown in Figure 4) and collect all the information regarding certifications and regulations 
into one readily accessible repository and create a defined system of processes. 
The lack of a system-level approach to integration elongates the timeline because 
certifications captured later in the process no longer have the ability to be pursued in 
parallel with, and may delay others. For example, during the review of an Airworthiness 
Certification request, the Electrical Power subject matter expert (SME) may require a 
Battery Certification. If this is not pursued in conjunction during the data collection 
effort, the Airworthiness Certification will be delayed until the Battery Certification is 
obtained. Technical challenges arise when interim approvals or waivers for these 
emergent certifications are obtained to satisfy the rigid fielding schedule without fully 
understanding the consequences of those decisions. For example, a full Battery 
Certification may take six (6) weeks to obtain. An interim approval may be obtained 
within a matter of weeks but may deploy a thermal battery with unknown operating 
restrictions and potentially dangerous consequences (e.g., explosive hazard).   
With the current undefined process, once a payload is delivered, it takes between 
24 and 36 months, depending on complexity of the effort, to thoroughly satisfy all the 
applicable statutory and regulatory requirements before the system can be integrated into 
the DoN inventory. This timeframe is unacceptable in supporting the rapidly evolving 
environment to which our war-fighters are exposed. For the sake of expediency the 
integration timeline is often shortened by waiving or inadvertently overlooking the 
systems-level requirements without an understanding of technical risk generated by these 
decisions,   This often results  in a rapidly-fielded system which may be technically 
insufficient to meet mission needs and could pose substantial risks to the warfighters in 
the future. To address these technical challenges and reduce the integration timeline, 
systems engineers must provide leadership with the information to balance cost, 




C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The DoN does not have a documented process that maintains sufficient Systems 
Engineering (SE) discipline to rapidly integrate and field new mission configurations for 
their inventory of modular STUAS to the fleet to support aggressive schedules and urgent 
user needs in a timeframe of 6 to 18 months instead of the typical 24 to 36 months while 
minimizing technical risk to mission success. The requirements for whether or not to 
perform each certification (sub process) in the current process are not well understood 
and are often addressed in a reactive fashion, sometimes when identified as the entry 
criteria for a different certification or approval  
1. Objectives 
The objective of this project was to create and document a comprehensive process 
for the integration of new capabilities of modular UAS into the DoN System, then 
conduct a SE trade study, similar to an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), to address the 
UAS systems integration challenges outlined above. The trade study’s goal was to find 
the best way to rapidly integrate new configurations, meet technical requirements, 
balance technical risk, and produce options for a rigorous SE process that can be tailored 
to meet program needs.  
2. Project Intention 
The purpose of this project was to conduct a trade study of a comprehensive SE 
plan to address payload integration of DoN System requirements onto Program Manager 
Air (PMA)-263 STUAS platforms. To complete this study, a documented process of the 
procedures to facilitate integration and fielding of new capabilities was developed. The 
documented process was used for modeling and simulation (M and S) of integration into 
the DoN System. The trade study allowed a tailoring of DoN System-level requirements 
to support the rapid integration and fielding of UAS capabilities. 
In the trade study, three (3) different integration situations were applied to the 
payload types to which the project was constrained: 
 10 
 
• Simple – The payload operates almost independently and requires minimal 
integration with the host platform. It cannot leverage off the existing 
certifications, but must pursue separate ones for its own sub-components. 
• Complex – The payload must be fully integrated with the host platform, utilizing 
existing sub-components that already have the required certifications (e.g. Laser, 
battery). Only the payload sub-components will need to pursue certification. 
• Mature – The payload has been integrated and certified for operation on a 
different platform. The remaining certifications to be pursued are those required 
for a new configuration of an existing platform (e.g. Airworthiness, 
Interoperability). 
In addition to pursuing full certifications, two strategies were implemented during 
each of these integration situations to reduce the overall certification timeline: 
• Full Certification – All applicable certifications are pursued for full approval. 
• Intermediate risk timeline reduction (IRTR) – Interim approvals were pursued 
for the applicable certifications that have long durations.  
• Low risk timeline reduction (LRTR) – The payload was composed of sub-
components that have existing certifications (e.g. Spectrum, CDL).   
3. Research Questions 
The following questions were identified by the RAIN Project Team as topics that 
the ultimate user of the developed process should understand prior to its implementation: 
• Which requirements are applicable to each specific type of payload? 
• What are the dependencies between certifications?  Which certifications must be 
done sequentially? Which can be done in parallel (i.e., are some prerequisites for 
others)?  
• What was a typical timeline (or range) for each certification? 




• Which requirements, applicable to the payload, can be waived or granted interim 
approval? 
• Where applicable, what does a waiver or interim approval authorize for each 
certification? 
• Which trade-offs (full certification, interim approvals, or use of previously-
certified components) can be done to support a compressed timeline? 
• Can the compressed timeline be achieved without the pursuit of waivers? 
• Can the compressed timeline be achieved without the pursuit of interim 
approvals? 
• For each certification that drives the schedule with available timeline reduction 
options, what are the risks if an interim approval was obtained? 
D. PROBLEM SCOPE  
 
Figure 5:  RAIN Project Problem Scope 
 
The scope of this project, shown in Figure 5, was limited to new capabilities that 
can be integrated into modular STUAS in the existing PMA 263 inventory. The candidate 
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payloads were limited to those that meet the technical requirements of the platform’s ICD 
and would not require re-design of the UAS or modification of the current airframe. 
1. Assumptions 
The following assumptions were applied as the entrance criteria to the RAIN 
project: 
• Capability satisfies technical requirements of platform (ICD and SWAP) for 
which it was developed  
• Capability satisfies TRL requirements for which the technology developer was 
applying 
• Capability has sufficient logistical support (spares and repairs) from developer 
• Capability has stable configuration that requires no further changes, except those 
identified as needed by integration process 
• Capability does not require modification of airframe for successful platform 
integration 
• Existing certifications for the platform automatically applies to the payload that 
fits within the system (i.e., Air-Ship Integration and Transportability) 
2. Constraints 
The following constraints were applied to the RAIN project: 
• Statutory and Regulatory requirements for UASs must be addressed 
• Timeline must support fielding within 18 months 
• Some requirements cannot be waived or granted interim approval 
• Detailed certification analysis 
• Timeline reductions were aggregated into two (2) types of strategies for the 
purposes of conducting simulation and analysis.  
• The effects of reducing the time to address a single certification by itself was 
not investigated or subjected to simulation. 
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• Payload types typically integrated onto PMA 263 platforms: 
• Laser designator 
• Electronic Warfare (EW) signal collection (Passive) 
• Active EW 
• Communications / Data Relay 
• RADAR Imaging 
E. STAKEHOLDERS 
 
Figure 6:  RAIN Project Stakeholders 
 
The project stakeholders are identified in the list below and shown in Figure 6. 
Project stakeholders interface with each other and the RAIN Team to help guide and 
scope the project, subject to RAIN advisors’ concurrence. The stakeholders can be 
broken down in to three (3) main groups, as listed below, and are further decomposed in 
Figure 7. While main stakeholders exist, when categorized into three (3) groups, each 
group’s interests were the same. The RAIN Team’s primary interest was in completing a 
Capstone project that showed the students’ mastery of SE while producing a useful 
product to other stakeholders. PMA-263’s primary interest was to implement a rapid 
system integration process while maintaining SE rigor. The external stakeholders’ 
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primary interest was in rapidly fielding new technology while reducing risk to technical 
challenges. 
• RAIN Team 
• Students 
• Advisors 
• PMA 263: 
• Chief Engineer 
• Weapon Systems Integration Integrated Product Team (IPT) Lead 
• Configuration Manager 
• External Stakeholders:  
• APEO (U and W) Engineering 
• Warfighters 
• Requirements Officers 
• Technology developer 
 




 External stakeholders, identified in the list below, all hold interest in the results 
of this project’s trade study analysis. Stakeholder interactions with the RAIN Team and 
each other are conceptualized in a cloud formation in Figure 7. PMA-263 was interested 
in the risks generated by different implementation options of the SE process to complete 
capabilities integration. Individual platform IPT leads were interested in what options 
they have when implementing an integration effort, and how their decisions would affect 
a systems engineer’s ability to maintain rigor while executing a program plan. The 
Requirements Officers and end users’ stake in this project revolved around delivering the 
end product. The technology developer’s interest was the ability to rapidly integrate and 
deliver their products, while maintaining SE rigor to reduce risk of future technical 
challenges. 
• PMA 263 
• Platform IPT Lead 
• Requirements Officers 
• Platform Integrators 
• Technology developers 
• Warfighters/End Users 
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F. TECHNICAL APPROACH 
1. Systems Engineering Process 
 
Figure 8: RAIN Tailored Systems Engineering Process (FHA 2013)  
 
The RAIN Team utilized a tailored “Vee” model, as shown in Figure 8 to outline 
the method used by the Team to develop a rapid transition process (RTP), which was one 
of the end products of the Capstone effort. In the Definition and Decomposition phase, 
the initial analysis of stakeholders’ needs to formulate the top-level requirements was 
conducted. Assessment of these requirements served as the foundation of the preliminary 
integration process, which led to further analysis in developing the detailed process. In 
the Integration and Re-composition phase, a model was established to simulate execution 
of the developed process, examine options that reduce process implementation time, and 
identify viable alternatives as an outcome. 
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2. Requirements Development Process 
The Team performed the following steps for the operational phase to identify the 
requirements necessary to develop the RTP. This was further detailed in the Operational 
Requirements Document in Appendix E.   
• Define the operational concept of the RTP System.  
• Define the system boundary by identifying what will be created or changed by the 
RTP System. In addition, identify what systems will provide inputs and/or accept 
outputs from the RTP.   
• Establish the objectives the RTP was intended to meet and decompose them into 
sub-objectives that can be allocated to functions and components. 
• Develop, analyze, and refine the requirements.   
• Ensure that there was a feasible design to meet the requirements. 
• Define the qualification requirements to verify and validate the resulting RTP. 
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II. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
A. REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT 
Through discussions with the stakeholders, the Team identified the following top-
level requirements that need to be satisfied for a successful payload integration process: 
1. Mission Requirement 
Develop a process that facilitates comprehensive integration of a new payload 
into the DoN System within 18 months. 
2. Stakeholder/User Requirement 
Develop a process that addresses all applicable statutory and regulatory 
requirements needed to integrate into the DoN System. 
3. System Requirement 
Develop a process that addresses the following requirements applicable to the 







B. DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION 
1. Operational Concept 
 
Figure 9:  RTP High Level Operational View (After) 
 
The RTP was intended to help ensure that the applicable statutory and regulatory 
requirements necessary for comprehensive integration of new payloads into the DoN 
System are addressed by the System Integrator with SE rigor. When a technology 
developer delivers a new payload to the System Integrator, required certifications are 
identified using the RTP. The individual certification processes are then implemented to 
collect the necessary information. If a data package was determined to be insufficient to 
obtain full certification and no further information was available or can be obtained 
within the required schedule, the applicable interim approval process documented by the 
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RTP will be utilized. The associated RTP risk assessment for pursuing an interim 
approval for the applicable certification will be provided to ensure the System Integrator 
was aware of the potential risks to the program. Upon compilation of the required data 
package, the certification application for full or interim approval was presented to the 
approval authority for review and ultimate endorsement. A graphic view of the 
operational concept is shown Figure 9.   
2. Rapid Transition Process (RTP) 
The RTP was designed to streamline the current disjointed integration approach 
employed by the PMA in fielding a new payload combination on a modular STUAS 
through early identification of the complete set of required certifications. It also supports 
a rapid fielding decision by providing the steps needed to pursue full or interim 
certifications. This was done by performing the RTP functions show in Figure 10 with 
the assistance of physical components in the form of checklists; certification 
requirements listings by system type; timeline reduction options listings, descriptions, 
and ratings; simulation results for cost and schedule for following certification baseline or 
timeline reduction strategies. 
 





The PMA initiates the RTP to support integration and fielding once the 
following have occurred: A payload developer delivers a new payload to the PMA; the 
developer provides data results from the tests it conducted; the PMA analyzes the data to 
determine if the payload meets SWAP requirements; the PMA analyzes the data to 
determine if it meets the ICD requirements for the intended STUAS; the PMA conducts a 
fit check and operational tests with satisfactory results; and all results are satisfactory. 
b. Determine Certifications to Pursue 
• Compare description of system of interest to the DRM archetypes 
studied / listed. 
• Pick baseline required certifications list of the archetype that 
matches the system of interest. 
• Use DRM Scenarios certifications listing in Figure 12, Figure 13, 
Figure 14, and Figure 22 or Table 1 to determine which 
certifications apply to your system and integration type. 
• Compare the projected (baseline) certifications schedule and cost 
(Figure  and Figure ) against the program requirements. 
• Decide whether schedule reduction was needed. 
• Compare potential schedule reductions from IRTR and LRTR in 
Figure  along with the associated cost in Figure  and risks in Figure 
32, Figure 33, and Figure 34 against the program requirements. 
Table 2 lists which certifications are addressed differently for 
IRTR and LRTR and indicates the modification. Additional detail 
on the risks and descriptions of the options that comprise both 
IRTR and LRTR are in the Timeline Reduction Options in 
“Section C Subsection 2 Project Intention” of this paper. 




• Use the certification checklist from Appendix H to mark which 
certifications are applicable and which are not for the chosen 
strategy.  
• Use the certification process model flow diagram for the chosen 
strategy (generic, IRTR, or LRTR) to guide through the next steps 
in Appendix F. 
c. Collect Certification Data  
Perform iteratively with analyzing the certification data. 
• Follow the order shown in the certification process model flow 
diagram for the chosen strategy. 
• From data provided by the developer:  Follow certification 
authorities POC’s guidance on data needed from the developers 
data package.   Certification authorities and guidance information 
on each certification can be found in the Component Analysis and 
Attribute Investigation section in Appendix H. 
• From T and E:  Conduct test and evaluation as directed by the 
certification authorities and SMEs to collect the data missing from 
the developers TDP.  
d. Analyze Certification Data  
Perform iteratively with collecting the certification data. 
• Follow the same order as used for data collection.  
• From data provided by the developer:  Have the collected data 
analyzed by the appropriate PMA SMEs and certification 
authorities POCs for completeness to determine what additional 
data was needed for the listed certifications. If the data wasa 
incomplete return to the collect data step and either request more 
data from the developer or conduct T and E. 
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• From T and E:  Analyze the data from test and evaluation for 
completeness. If incomplete return to the collect data step and 
conduct additional T and E.  
• From analysis:  Have the collected data analyzed against the 
certifications’ requirements. Depending on the certification this 
may need to be done the certification authority or a qualified third 
party.  
• Submit favorable results to the certification technical approval 
authority for approval. 
• Unfavorable results may require waivers or design changes in 
order for the system to be acceptable for field use. Research this 
with the PMA SMEs and certification approval authority POCs. 
• Document the findings and proceed to addressing residual risk. 
e. Address Risk 
• Have the analysis findings reviewed for program risk. 
• Where the findings are not clear conduct addition analysis or 
discussions with the certification technical authority’s SMEs. 
• Provide the risk assessment to the fielding decision maker and to 
the certification package. 
f. Develop Certification Package for Decision Maker 
• Detail the certifications attempted and the results; approved, 
waived,  or not. 
• Explanation why only those certifications were needed. 
• Collect and attach the signed approvals, along with any statements 
of residual risk or limited operational boundaries. 
• Attach the risk assessment.  
• Provide to the system fielding decision maker in PMA-263. 
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g. RTP Conclusion 
The RTP ends when the fielding decision package was judged to be 
complete by the decision maker, and a fielding decision was made. 
3. Projected Operational Environment 
a. Operating Environment 
The projected environment in which the RTP was expected to perform 
was one of finite resources.   
• Manpower availability will be limited due to the need for 
personnel to support multiple PMAs simultaneously.   
• Government labs and ranges will also provide similar limitations 
due to the inflexibility of their schedules.    
• Fixed review board schedules for the approval authority may have 
limited ability to add extra convening dates for data package 
presentation.   
b. Potential Payload  
The payload that will initiate the RTP process may have one or more of 
the following attributes: 
• Insufficient information to support prompt and/or full endorsement 
by the approval authority. 
• Procured in response to an Urgent Need Statement, thus requiring 
rapid fielding. 
• A commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) payload, such that additional 
data or redesign was not contractually feasible. 
• The types of payloads that will be integrated. 
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4. Mission Success Requirements 
For the mission to be considered a success, the RTP must address all applicable 
statutory and regulatory requirements to support the fielding decision of the new payload 
into the DoN System within 18 months. To accomplish this, the process must identify the 
necessary certifications and the information required to obtain full authorization. The 
RTP must also identify in what sequence the applicable certifications must be pursued to 
support the system integrator’s 18-month schedule requirement. If interim approvals are 
required due to cost, performance, or schedule constraints, RTP will provide an 
applicable risk assessment to ensure the system integrator was cognizant of the potential 
impacts of not obtaining a full certification. 
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5. Mission Execution 
a. Operational Activities 
 
Figure 11:  RPT External Systems IDEF0 (Integration DEFinition for Function 
Modeling) 
 
The operational activities required to comprehensively field a new payload 
into the DON System are shown in Figure 11 and described in the following: 
• Address programmatic activities needed to field a new capability 
• Obtain the statutory and regulatory requirements that must be 
satisfied to field a new capability on an existing platform within 
the PMA inventory. 
• Perform the payload integration process - RTP 
• Perform testing on the new capability  
• Obtain certification approvals 
• Field the new capability 
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b. Operational Situations/Mission Scenarios 
The RTP was assessed through modeling and simulation against three (3) 
potential mission scenarios.   
(1) Full Certification for All Applicable Requirements 
The data initially collected from the Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM) is reviewed by the NAVAIR SMEs and deemed to be sufficient to 
support full certification of the payload. This scenario was depicted in Figure 12 and 
described below: 
• Technology developer delivers the payload to PMA-263 
• PMA-263 determines the applicable certification and 
collects data from the developer 
• Technology developer provides requested data 
• PMA-263 forwards data to SMEs for review 
• SMEs determine that data is sufficient 
• PMA-263 develops a data package to support the 
certification application and forwards to the Approval 
Authority 
• Approval Authority certifies the payload 





Figure 12:  Full Certification Use-Case 
 
(2) Additional Testing Required For At Least One 
Requirement 
The data initially collected from the OEM is reviewed by the 
NAVAIR SMEs and deemed to be insufficient to submit a certification request package. 
The PMA requests the OEM provide additional data and/or T and E facilities conduct 
tests to obtain required information. The tests are conducted and/or additional data is 
received from the technology developer to supplement the inadequate data packages. This 
scenario was shown in Figure 13 and described below: 
• Technology developer delivers the payload to PMA-263 
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• PMA-263 determines the applicable certification and 
collects data from the developer 
• Technology developer provides requested data 
• PMA-263 forwards data to SMEs for review 
• SMEs determine that data is insufficient and additional 
data/testing will be required 
• PMA-263requests more data from the technology 
developer 
• PMA-263 requests T and E facilities to conduct tests to 
collect more data 
• Technology developer provides additional data 
• T and E facilities provide test reports 
• PMA-263 forwards additional data to SMEs for review 
• Repeat Steps 5–8 until SMEs determine that data is 
sufficient 
• PMA-263 develops a data package to support the 
certification application and forwards to the Approval 
Authority 
• Approval Authority certifies the payload 





Figure 13:  Additional Testing Use-Case 
 
(3) Interim Approval Requested For At Least One 
Requirement 
The data initially collected from the OEM is reviewed by the 
NAVAIR SMEs and deemed to be insufficient. Due to schedule constraints, the PMA 
decides to forego additional testing and pursues a waiver or interim certification. This 
scenario was shown in Figure 14 and described below: 
• Technology developer delivers the payload to PMA-263 
• PMA-263 determines the applicable certification and 
collects data from the developer 
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• Technology developer provides requested data 
• PMA-263 forwards data to SMEs for review 
• SMEs determine that data is insufficient and additional 
data/testing will be required 
• PMA-263requests more data from the technology 
developer 
• No additional data available without further testing 
• PMA-263 deems that the compressed schedule cannot 
support further testing, so waivers/interim approvals will be 
necessary.   PMA-263 develops a data package to support 
the waiver/interim certification application and forwards to 
the Waiver/Approval Authority 
• Waiver/Approval Authority waives or provides interim 
certification of the payload 











C. FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES HIERARCHY 
 
Figure 15:  RTP Fundamental Objective Hierarchy 
 
The core purpose of the system was to reduce the time it takes to obtain fielding 
approval of a new payload and STUAS combination. Currently, the main obstacle was 
ensuring that all statutory and regulatory requirements have been addressed while still 
meeting the required fielding timeline. These requirements exist to reduce the 
performance, safety, and cost risk involved in fielding a weapon system or air platform 
into the DoN inventory. Any effort to reduce the time taken to prepare for and make a 
fielding decision must include identifying risks associated with interim approvals and 
balancing the benefits with the risks. The fundamental objective was decomposed into 
progressively more concrete objectives until they formed the measures of effectiveness 
and the system technical performance measures. The fundamental objectives are detailed 
below and shown in Figure 15. 
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• Minimize time to comprehensively integrate new capability into DoN  
o Minimize time to address statutory and  regulatory requirements 
 Minimize time to Determine Needed Certifications 
• Time to determine needed certifications value curve 
 Minimize time to address needed certifications, including time to collect 
additional data. 
• Time to process waivers/interim value curve 
• Time to obtain full certification value curve 
o Minimize risks 
 Minimize interim approvals 
• Percentage of interim approvals value curve 
1. Value Curves 
At the bottom of the fundamental objectives hierarchy are the value curves that 
capture the PMA’s normalized weighting of the utility value of each of the bottom level 
objectives. They are represented by both stand-alone functions that describe usefulness 
on a continuum from most utility to no utility, and normalizing weighting factors. The 
weighting factors defined the importance of each bottom-level objective to achieving the 
PMA’s goal. Together, the utility values and weights formed value products that, when 
summed, allowed the direct comparison of different system designs.   
Because the importance of starting with the end in mind (Covey 2004 95) for 
planning the execution of a complex set of certifications and approvals, along with the 
conviction that a well-formed system should easily expedite planning, the time to 
determine needed certifications was weighted at 15%. The relative impact of risk due to 
interim approvals was determined to also be 15%. The main source of delay, and 
currently the driving force in accepting unidentified risk, has been the time it takes to 
address the required certifications and approvals. The time to obtain interim approvals 
and the time to obtain full certifications were both set at 35%. This weighting strongly 
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favored strategies that utilize payloads comprised of components that have already been 
certified and approved.  
The primary objective of the RTP was to quickly integrate a new capability into 
the DoN System. Because of this, the process became less attractive as more time passed 
the capability can be fielded. This resulted in value curves with a linear shape and 
weightings obtained from the PMA, as depicted in Figure 15. 
2. Measures of Success 
Analysis of the fundamental objectives expressed by the stakeholders in section 
2.3 resulted in the identification of measures of effectiveness (MOE) and performance 
(MOP) by the RAIN Team. 
a. MOE 
To encourage utilization of the designed product, it was important to 
identify the users’ ultimate objective:  rapidly field a new payload. For this project, the 
mission to be accomplished was the fielding of a new capability to the warfighter. To 
successfully support this objective, the RAIN project developed a process that was able to 
facilitate comprehensive integration of a new payload into the DoN System. This resulted 
in the following MOE: 
• MOE: Probability of addressing all statutory and regulatory requirements to 
enable fielding of a new payload to the warfighter in 18 months. 
b. MOP 
The identified MOE identified above was decomposed into the following 
MOPs and subsequent Technical Performance Measures (TPM). 
• MOP:  Number of interim Technical Certifications  
o TPM - % requirements that need interim approval  
• MOP:  Median time to gain approval to field a new capability 
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o TPM - Number of months from platform integration of new 
capability until approval to field newly configured STUAS 
D. ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT 
The RTP architecture section was an overview of the RTP structure. Appendix C 
provides the complete RTP architecture, which consists of component structure, 
Functional Flow Block Diagram (FFBD), and Integration Definition for Function 
Modeling (IDEF0) for the entire system function. 
The proposed RTP system baseline architecture was designed allowing payload 
integration to be a flexible and adaptable SE process. The CORE® architecture 
development program by Vitech® was utilized to plan the system architecture, creating a 
top-down design to identify the new payload integration process.  
The RTP baseline architecture was developed from an evaluation of the functional 
requirements derived from the problem statement and scope. This design was analyzed 
and compared against the system’s architecture needs to identify tradeoffs between the 
functional requirements and the desired integration and fielding timeline. The current 
PMA-263 UAS certification process was used to determine the additional architectural 
components needed to support the RTP functional and operational capabilities.  
The functional architecture defines the logic of what will be done by the system. 
According to Buede, not only does it contain “…a hierarchical model of the functions 
performed by the system…” (Buede 2009 194–211, 213), but its development must 
comply with exit criteria that require “…the coherent matching of the input/output 
requirements with the functions and items in the functional architecture…in increasing 
layers of detail, so the exit criterion…will be applied with each completion of a layer of 
detail.” (Buede 2009 194–211, 213). This starts with leveraging the concept of operations 
to define the system boundaries and interfaces with external systems, and continues to 




The physical architecture defines what will perform the functions detailed in the 
functional architecture. A RTP physical architecture was not fully developed, or utilized, 
because the system was primarily logical and would employ simple forms and diagrams 
as the physical components.   
 
1. System Boundary 
 
Figure 16:  RTP External Systems Diagram 
 
The RTP External Systems Diagram, shown in Figure 16, shows the external 
system interfaces utilized by the RTP. The systems located within the box are those 
impacted by the RTP. The environment outside of the box is composed of systems that 
impact, but are not affected, by the RTP. The out-going arrows identify systems that are 
impacted by the RTP, while those that impact the RTP are identified with in-coming 
arrows.  
The RTP architecture was the product of an iterative process of definition, 
decomposition, and refinement. The RTP External Interfaces Diagram (Figure 11) was 
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the result of extensive analysis of the requirements, concept of operations, fundamental 
objectives, and system boundary interfaces. The diagram shows that the RAIN Project 
will have to interact with PMA-263 for system-related requirements and in developing 
the RTP to provide them with the fielding decision support package; certification 
technical authorities, for both direction on the statutory and regulatory requirements and 
for certification reviews for approval; and the T and E facilities to determine the 
performance of the system relative to certification requirements. The RPT inputs, outputs, 
triggers, and mechanisms, more clearly shown in Figure 17, which was used extensively 
during the functional decomposition. 
 
Figure 17:  RTP Inputs/Outputs with External Systems 
 
2. Architecture Design 
The RTP was designed to obtain a fielding decision approval within 18 months, 
while managing the risk of meeting a rapid timeline. RTP supports and brings order to the 
process of integrating a new payload combination on a modular STUAS by determining 
the complete set of required certifications; and identifying the options and risks to 
pursuing full certifications, interim certifications, or a combination of the two (2). The 
RTP involves the following steps: 
• Determining which certifications are required for the payload of interest. 
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• Collecting the required support documentation and analyzing for completeness 
• Employing T and E as needed to answer all open questions 
• Identifying and addressing the residual risks 
• Assembling data packages 
• Developing certification request packages 
• Requesting full or interim approval for each required certification  
3. RTP Functional Architecture 
 
Figure 18:  RTP Functional Hierarchy 
 
The RTP Functional Hierarchy in Figure 18 was produced following the clear 
definition of the system boundaries and interfaces during the functional decomposition. 
This functional hierarchy was extended to a sufficient level of detail to construct the 
schedule, cost models, and user tools; including check lists and flow diagrams. The useful 
hierarchy depth was decomposed to three (3) levels and shows the decomposition 
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relationships of the five (5) basic functions Figure 19 of the RTP system, and details the 
sub-functions. 
 
Figure 19:  RTP Top Level Functions (IDEF0) 
 
The top-level functions were determined by analysis of the top level input, output, 
interface, and functional requirements, as well as the fundamental objectives and system 
boundary interfaces. The requirements were derived from the functional objective 
hierarchy, system boundary and interface definitions, and the concept of operations.   
Once the first level of functions (including inputs, outputs, triggers, and 
mechanisms) were defined, the next levels were determined through logical 
decomposition and analysis of the top level requirements, and analysis of the 
fundamental objectives hierarchy. In each level, the requirements were allocated to 
functions to ensure that all requirements were met and needed. This was continued until 
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III. COMPONENT ATTRIBUTE INVESTIGATION 
The Team’s research into the statutory and regulatory requirements resulted in the 
identification of potential certifications, as shown in Figure 20 that would need to be 
obtained prior to fielding a new payload. The RTP shall satisfy the necessary DoN 






































Figure 20:  Applicable Certification Categories 
 
The certifications were separated into four (4) categories, in accordance with the 
System Requirements identified earlier: 
• Safety 
• Airworthiness 






• Range Safety 
• E3 
• Security 
• Information Assurance (IA) 
• Anti-Tamper (AT) 
• Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) 
• Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA) 
• Interoperability 
• Spectrum 




• Test and Evaluation (T and E) 
A brief overview of each certification with details of the artifacts needed for a 
complete data package is provided in Appendix H.   
A. RESEARCH MATRIX 
The RAIN project research matrix shown in Figure 21 and further detailed in 
Appendix D, was a living document used to capture and summarize information about the 
statutory and regulatory requirements required to support a fielding decision. The gray 
and blue fields contain the name of each certification and, where applicable, each sub-
certification; the person assigned to conduct the research; whether it was in scope; the 
type of requirement (statutory or regulatory); the top level actively-used guiding 
instruction and supporting guidance(s); the approving authority office or organization; 
whether interim approval or waivers were allowed; what office could grant waivers or 
interim approvals; a listing of the required documentation; whether testing was required 
to support the certification approval; the best case (Low), most likely case (Med) and 
worst case (High) values for cost, lead-time, and certification activity duration; and 
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explanatory notes. Below the summary data fields is the table of multipliers used for 
converting point estimates into triangular distributions for the model (based on the SME’s 
assessment of the risk associated with the estimate) (Raymond 1999, 147–156). The un-
shaded fields to the right of the summary data detailed the “Risk Simulator” models for 
the all-inclusive generic cost, as well as the time reduction strategy costs for each DRM 
use case. The green and brown fields hold the reference data for the triangular input 
distributions and the tan fields hold the summation expressions as well as the reference 
data for the statistical output collection. 
 
Figure 21:  RAIN Research Matrix and Cost Model Snapshot (Detail Shown in 
Appendix D) 
 
B. PREREQUISITE CERTIFICATIONS 
During the investigation of the above components, the RAIN Team discovered 
that all certifications could not be pursued concurrently; some certifications require the 
completion of others before they can be obtained. The following certifications were 
identified as having prerequisites, with specific relationships documented in a tailored 
schedule in Appendix I: 
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• E3  
Figure 22 provides a graphical representation of the order in which the applicable 
certifications should be pursued: 
 
Figure 22:  Prerequisite Certifications 
 
For example, Airworthiness certification cannot be issued until Safety, Air-Ship 
Integration (if applicable), Environmental, and E3 are first obtained.   
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IV. PROCESS TRADE STUDY 
A. MODELING AND SIMULATION (M AND S) OVERVIEW 
“All models are bad, but some are useful” (Box, G. E., Draper, N. R 1987). 
Because of the complicated interactions between the sub-processes involved in approving 
the integration of a new payload onto a STUAS and approving the use of the new system, 
M and S was used to represent and test the overall integration approval process schedule 
and associated cost. Models assisted in understanding the current sub-processes of 
individual certifications, the generic process of addressing all certifications, the impact of 
tailoring to match the DRMs, and the RTP timeline reduction options. The simulations 
were used to verify the model of the generic process and to project the performance of it, 
as tailored to match the DRMs, and as tailored to implement timeline reduction strategy 
options. For each DRM of payload type and run the desired process would be one that 
addresses all required certifications or accreditations within the desired schedule without 
incurring unacceptable risk. In the event that more than one process met these provisions, 
then the one most closely optimized the criteria from the fundamental objectives 
hierarchy (Figure 27) would be chosen. The DRM scenarios were chosen by PMA-263 to 
cover the most likely upcoming payload and STUAS integrations. The Team’s work 
elicited from SMEs the probable schedule, cost, and risks the program manager would 
need to understand to make an informed decision regarding the available options 
presented. The available options included varying the order the certifications were 
addressed, within the constraints of the order dependency prerequisites; and 
implementing or not implementing timeline reduction strategies of subsystem interim or 
previous certifications. The results were used to show the relationship between schedule 
compression and cost, associated with the application of timeline reduction strategies to 
the process. Risk expansion related to schedule compression was examined further in the 
Risk Section of this paper 
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B. GENERIC MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
The time model was built in iGrafx because of how well it represents process 
flows and utilized data gathered in the required certifications research matrix (Appendix 
D). This data was used to model each certification sub-process cost and schedule as 
simple triangular distributions (Following (Raymond 1999 147–156)). In order to explore 
the theoretical upper and lower bounds on the time required to complete all of the 
certifications models were built for pursuing certifications in an all serial flow and in an 
all parallel flow. These obviously produced results that were outside of what would either 
be allowed (all parallel) or desired (all serial). Prior to the iterative corrections involved 
in building the final generic model; an all serial flow took a mean of 109 months and an 
all parallel flow took a mean of 16 months (reference the first four slides in Appendix F). 
The dependency prerequisite relationships among the various certifications, discussed 
earlier, were used to build and order the generic model from the individual ‘building 
block’ certification sub-process model representations. The final generic model used 
parallel flows where ever possible, and not proscribed by dependency prerequisite 
relationships, instead of serial in order to minimize overall schedule time to address all of 
the certifications. Additional SME input was used to iteratively refine the generic model 
until it appropriately captured the flow, prerequisite relationships, and durations, as 







Figure 23:  Generic RTP certifications process flow model for cycle time  




The generic cost model was built in Excel alongside the Research Matrix 
(Appendix D). The cost ranges of Low, Most Likely, and High were used as parameters 
to form triangular distribution inputs in Risk Simulator® (Figure 24). The cost model was 
built in Risk Simulator® because, as a Microsoft Excel® add-on, it allowed the cost 
model to be built fairly quickly and outputted nearly complete statistical representations 
of the results, including histograms, which required very little additional work for 
analysis. The output for the generic model was defined as the sum of all the costs from 
each of the individual distributions, and contained the control tests for successful 
completion.  
 
Figure 24:  Cost Model Simulation Input Distribution example. 
 
The generic model represented the case where all possible certifications and 
approvals were required. This was used to simulate the time involved in the worst case 
successful single start approval process. The results of simulating the process with the 
generic all inclusive model showed that despite being built from inputs of triangular 
distributions the output was approximately normal, as shown in Figure 25 and Figure 26. 
This reflected the assertion of the central limit theorem which states that for independent 
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and identically distributed real variables (RV) the distributions for the sum of the 
variables, and also the mean of the RVs, are approximately normal when the number of 
samples (n) is large enough (> 30) (Devore J.L 2008, Sect. 5.4). The real values in this 
case came from 43 independent triangular value distributions. The normal distribution 
results facilitated communication with SMEs about the models. 
Normal
 




100% Exceed 78 week limit
 
Figure 26:  Capability Analysis Chart for Generic Model  
(with upper specification limit of 78 weeks.) 
 
The mean cycle time of the worst case scenario is well above the desired cycle 
time upper limit of 78 weeks, with a mean cost (Figure 27) of $1.8M. Expert opinion 
verified these results, confirming that the model accurately represented the process.   This 
led to the development of the proposed “to-be” baseline process models (Dam 2006) for 




Figure 27:  Cost Statistical Analysis for Generic Model 
 
C. MODELS DEFINTIONS – RAIN PROJECT CASE STUDIES 
Although five (5) payloads were earlier identified as components typically 
integrated by PMA-263, the identical required certifications for RADAR, 
Communications/Data Relay, and Active EW enabled their consolidation into one. The 
remaining DRMs of LASER Designator, Passive EW, and Active EW payloads were 
determined by PMA-263 representatives to require the certifications identified in Table 1. 
For each certification Green means the certification was required, while Red or Blue 
means the certification was not. 
Three (3) scenarios with different integration complexity were utilized for each 
DRM payload:  Simple, Complex, and Mature Payload. In a Simple Integration, the 
payload has little interface with the platform; all components needed for operation were 
self-contained within the payload. In a Complex Integration, the payload interfaces with 
the platform, requiring the use of the existing components (e.g., battery, datalinks, etc.). 
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In a Mature Payload Integration, the payload was delivered with the majority of the 
required certifications already obtained. 
Models for each of the DRM payloads were then formed from the generic model 
by removing unneeded certification sub-processes.   
 
Table 1:  DRM Run Definitions  
(Red= Certification Required, Green/Blue=Certification Not Required) 
 
Timeline reduction strategies were formulated to exploit the allowance for some 
of the certifications to be either interim or previously completed and are summarized in 
Table 2. While the RTP starts after the delivery of a properly operating payload, the 
PMA-263 decides which payloads are developed and can insist that certain subsystems in 
the payload be ones that were previously certified in order to negate the need for the 
certifications that would drive the fielding decision beyond 18 months. Whether this was 
done would be in the payload design description data provided with the payload. This 
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was a subset of the benefits realized by using standard parts, but may not be realizable on 
a regular basis until the industrial base for the required small and ruggedized subsystems 
becomes more mature. Due to the undesired nature of waivers, the option of using 
previously certified sub-systems or components to bypass some of the long duration 
certifications was introduced instead of considering waivers. The time distributions for all 
of the full certifications are in the research matrix (Appendix D columns Q through V) 
and are the sums of the lead time from request to start of work on the certification and the 
duration to actually process and provide findings (approval/rejection). The time 
distribution changes for each timeline reduction strategy are listed in Appendix G section 
1, and represent significant reductions from the baseline full certification values.   
The individual options for shortening the certification timelines were aggregated 
into two (2) alternative strategies: intermediate risk timeline reduction (IRTR) and low 
risk timeline reduction (LRTR). This could have been done for any combination full, 
interim, previous, or waived certifications by simply changing the time distribution in the 
definition of the certification(s) of interest, rerunning the simulation, exporting the data 
Minitab®, conducting statistical analysis, capturing the new flow diagram (showing the 
new distribution values), capturing the statistical analysis results, and organizing into a 
brief. All this takes about 20 minutes for each model change. This was not done for 
expediency reasons since we were already up to 27 runs (9 hours) from the three DRMs 
of three runs each and three different strategies. If it had been done we would be 20 
minutes x 3 DRMs x 3 runs x a minimum of (12+1) simple individual changes (Appendix 
G Table 2) = 39 hours to just collect the data. The use of Minitab® and DOE could be 
used in the future to extend our work to optimize the RTP for specific DRMs and run 
types. The IRTR strategy was composed of pursuing interim certification or approvals for 
Battery, IA, Spectrum, and JITC; and a Category 3 IFC, while shifting OT during initial 
fielding. Interim approvals accept more risk than full certifications or using previously 
certified subsystems, but less risk than skipping it altogether, leading to this strategy 
being called “Intermediate Risk Timeline Reduction.” The LRTR strategy was comprised 
of using previously certified or approved data links, batteries, transmitters, and GPS 
receivers while pursuing a Category Three (3) IFC and conducting a combined DT/OT. 
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In comparison to using unproven subsystems, using a previously certified item is low 
risk, thus the name “Low Risk Timeline Reduction.”  A summary of the strategies are in 
Table 2; ‘FULL’ means full certification is pursued, ‘Interim’ means a interim 
certification is pursued, ‘Previous Cert’ means that certification was completed previous 
to the triggering subsystem being used in this payload. These strategies were then applied 
to the baseline model of full certifications for each DRM run cases. 
 
CERTIFICATION IRTR LRTR 
CDL FULL Previous Cert 
IFC CAT 3 CAT 3 
Battery Interim Previous Cert 
IA Interim FULL 
Spectrum Interim Previous Cert 
T and E  OT in fielding Joint  DT OT 
JTIC Interim FULL 
SAASM FULL Previous Cert 
Table 2:  Timeline Reduction Strategies Sub-Process  
(Changes Summary) 
 
D. RTP MODELING AND SIMULATION RESULTS 
The baseline (BL) processes were found to take longer than 78 weeks (18 months) 
on average for most of the DRM scenario runs, as shown in Table 3. The two (2) timeline 
reduction strategies (IRTR and LRTR) were then applied to each baseline run definition 
from each DRM. Simulation showed that both strategies brought the mean time to 
complete all of the required certifications to less than 78 weeks in almost all runs, with 
the associated risk of exceeding the time limit determined through statistical analysis. 
These satisfactory results, summarized in Table 3, reinforced the Team’s resolve to not 




BL IRTR LRTR BL IRTR LRTR BL IRTR LRTR
1 89 51 52 80 1.2 0.8 1324 859 1043
2 88 51 52 78 1.2 1 1269 437 1037
3 43 25 32 0 0 0 520 55 287
1 180 92 77 100 87.1 45.9 1726 1230 1387
2 88 51 51 77 1.3 1 1233 785 1022
3 34 14 29 0 0 0 520 55 287
1 180 90 77 100 84.4 45.9 1726 1230 1413
2 132 51 51 100 1.1 1 1287 817 1047
3 102 25 30 99.5 0 0 530 60 290
Active EW
Chance to Exceed 





Table 3:  Mean Simulation Results 
 
The source statistics for Table 3 came from the statistical analysis charts 
generated in Minitab® for all 27 scenarios. Examples of these charts, shown in Figure 28, 
Figure 29, and Figure 30, show the cycle time statistics resulting from the application of 
IRTR to run 2 for the Passive Electronic Warfare payload. The full collection of the 
statistical analysis charts for all scenarios is collected in Appendix H. Because the 
number of different certifications involved in the 27 scenarios shown in Table 3 varied 
from a high of 36 down to a low of 8, the effects of the central limit theorem varied as 
well. This variance manifested in the distributions for schedule appearing to be normal in 
a few cases, log normal in several cases, and triangular in a few cases; in proportion to 




Figure 28:  Graphic Statistical Summary of overall certification cycle time  
(for Passive Electronic Warfare Run 2 with IRTR applied.) 
 
 
Figure 29:  Normality Test with percentile below 78 weeks  




1.26% Exceed 78 
week limit.
 
Figure 30:  Capability Analysis chart with upper specification limit of 78 Weeks  
(for Passive Electronic Warfare Run 2 with IRTR applied.) 
 
1. Cost Analysis 
Figure 31 shows the cost models for all of the DRM scenarios. A much larger and 
more readable version of this can be found in Appendix F at the beginning of the RTP 
Cost Simulation section. The basic triangular cost distribution model for each 
certification is described in the gray fields on the left side of the figure, with each model 
in a single labeled column. The green and brown fields indicate the costs included in that 
model. Numbers in (or next to) the colored field are multipliers applied to the basic 
triangular distribution from the gray fields. The fractional multipliers, such as 0.5 and 
0.25, account for the fact that interim approvals require less work than the full 
certifications. The integer multipliers, such as 4 or 2, represent the number of times that 
WSESRB is usually repeated in the modeled scenario. The light tan fields at the bottom 
hold the summation logic and the reference to the Risk Simulator® data collection and 
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statistical analysis charts. Further detail on the cost analysis can be found in Appendix F. 
The cost distributions varied from normal, to log normal, and to triangular in proportion 
to the number of cost RVs in the cost summation varying from 36 to 8; as predicted by 
the central limit theorem.  
 
Figure 31:  Cost Models for all Scenarios 
 
The cost results from the simulations are summarized in Table 4, which shows 
that the cost generally goes down with decreased work. The LRTR strategy was not the 
lowest cost option because it retains OT as a partial cost certification, which was 
relatively expensive, and the IRTR strategy moves OT to preliminary fielding. Also, the 
IRTR strategy results in less cost variability because OT, which has relatively high cost 




Table 4:  Simulation Results for Costs 
 
E. MODELING AND SIMULATION SUMMARY 
Modeling and simulation was used to explore the costs and schedule times 
associated with different designs of the RTP. Modeling and simulation was conducted 
using both Risk Simulator® (an Excel add-on) for cost and in iGrafx® for the time to 
complete certifications. The time to collect and present the results of the certifications to 
the fielding decision maker was considered to be insignificant and was excluded from the 
model. Modeling started with conducting all certifications all in parallel, then all series, 
and then as a generic series-parallel hybrid constrained by the certification dependency 
prerequisite requirements. Simulation with these models defined the outer edges of 
schedule performance when pursuing all possible certifications. The generic model was 
then tailored to only include the certifications required for nine different DRM run cases. 
Each of the DRM models were then modified to create separate models that reflected the 
application of both the IRTR and LRTR timeline reduction strategies to each of the DRM 
run cases. 
Simulation with an early model with all certification conducted in series showed 
the upper mean time to complete at approximately 109 months. Simulation with an early 
model that conducted all certifications in parallel showed that lower mean time to 
complete was approximately 16 months. With the understanding that there were several 
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dependency prerequisite relationships, this indicated that it was unlikely we could 
complete all possible certifications within 18 months without some certifications be 
removed or reduced. Simulation with the generic prerequisite constrained series-parallel 
hybrid model of conducting all possible certifications the mean time to complete was 45 
months. Completing all possible certifications in less than 18 months was only possible if 
all certifications were done in a very highly parallel manner, and the required dependency 
prerequisite relationships prevented this.   
Simulation with models based on the generic model but tailored to reflect only the 
certifications required by each DRM run case show that the mean (baseline) completion 
time for all required certifications was only less than 18 months for mature (Run 3) DRM 
run cases for LASER Designator and Passive Electronic Warfare payloads; timeline 
reduction strategies would be required for all other DRM run cases. 
Simulation with the two timeline reduction strategies (IRTR and LRTR) applied 
to all DRM run cases showed that the mean time to complete the required certification 
could be brought to less than 18 months in most cases through the application of either 
timeline reduction strategies, as detailed in Table 3. The exceptions were the DRM run 
cases for both Passive EW and Active EW which only the LRTR strategy reduced the 
mean completion time to less than 18 months.   
Cost simulation was conducted to understand the impact the various DRM run 
cases and timeline reduction strategies had on cost and to support budget planning. The 
cost results for the simulations are listed in the left most column of Table 3 and in Table 
4. The baseline full certifications process consistently costs more due to the timeline 
reduction strategies reducing the work involved. While the application of the IRTR 
strategy consistently cost the least, it was at a higher performance risk, as detailed in the 








V. RAIN RISK ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW OF RISKS 
Risk analysis takes the information at hand and compares it to previously defined 
criteria to determine the potential impact and likelihood of that event occurring. In the 
RTP cost and schedule data and statistics were derived from simulations with models. 
The risks to schedule are centered on the impact and likelihood of exceeding 78 weeks 
(18 months). The increased performance risks associated with each task’s timeline 
reduction strategies are direct SME opinions on the nature of the increased impact, and 
the increased likelihood of it occurring given that the given strategy was implemented. 
The Baseline cases were assumed to have no additional performance risk. 
B. SCHEDULE AND PERFORMANCE RISK 
The statistical results from running the schedule model simulation 500 times were 
used to calculate the maximum number of weeks the schedule might exceed 78 weeks 
and the likelihood of exceeding that threshold for each of the 27 scenarios. Once 
calculated, the values were entered into summary tables, with one table for each DRM 
base scenario. Both the calculations and the summary tables can be found in Appendix G. 
The schedule risk ratings were determined by comparing the percent likelihood against 
the rating value definitions in Table 5 and the impact values against the impact rating 
value definitions in Table 6. For each scenario and run the corresponding risk ratings 
were then used to mark the risk cube (Table 7) with the initials for the risk type and run 




Table 5:  Risk Likelihood Definitions 
 
 





Table 7:  Generic Risk Cube Diagram 
 
Similarly, the statistical results from 10,000 simulation runs with the cost model 
were used to determine the maximum amount, in $K, that the cost might exceed the mean 
and the likelihood of doing so for each of the 27 scenarios. The mean was used for cost 
because that was the most common amount used for budgeting. These values were then 
entered in the same summary table with schedule values, found in Appendix G. 
Performance risk estimates were determined based on timeline reduction options, 
performance risk value definitions in Table 6, and likelihood value definitions in Table 5. 
Once determined, the risk rating values were recorded directly in the risk rating tables. 
C. RISK ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
The values in the risk rating tables (Table 8, Table 9, and Table 10) were used to 
mark the risk level in the corresponding risk cubes (Figure 32, Figure 33, and Figure 34). 
The risk analysis took the statistical data derived from simulation with the models for the 
various DRM run cases and information elicited from the PMA-263 SMEs and compared 
them to the risk definitions in Tables 5 and 6 to determine risk ratings. Schedule Risk 
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ratings were determined for the Baseline (full certifications) and both timeline reduction 
strategies. Added performance risk ratings were only determined for the timeline 
reduction strategies.   
As expected, the IRTR and LRTR strategies applied to mature payloads had the 
lowest schedule risks because of the liberal use of interim approvals and pre-certified 
components. For each payload type, the Simple Integration Baseline had the highest 
schedule risks because all applicable certifications had to be pursued for full approval. 
This can be mitigated through early implementation of the RTP checklist (Appendix H) 
and tailor-able schedule (Appendix I) to identify which certifications and their associated 
data requirements are needed.   
No performance risks were assessed against the Baseline strategy because 
thorough analysis was expected during the pursuit of full certification. The LRTR option 
offered the lowest performance risks because previously certified components would 
have had sufficient analysis/testing prior to authorization. The IRTR strategy had 
moderate performance risks because interim approvals are granted due to operational 
needs and limited data availability, resulting in potentially unknown hazards. To mitigate 
this risk level, early identification of the required data and testing should be provided to 
the technology developer to support a more comprehensive certification request package.   
In this situation, an interim approval would only be necessary to provide the certification 




Table 8: LASER Designator Risk Table 
 
 





Table 9: Passive EW Risk Table 
 
 





Table 10:  Active EW Risk Tables 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The RAIN Team successfully consolidated individual procedures currently 
employed independently by the responsible NAVAIR competencies into the systematic 
RTP process that efficiently satisfies the applicable Statutory and Regulatory 
requirements needed to successfully integrate a new capability into the DoN System. 
Having a process enabled the use of modeling and simulation and through the modeling 
and simulation of payload types most commonly installed on PMA-263 platforms, the 
Team determined that full certification of the modified system using the developed 
process can take between 34 and 180 weeks. This schedule also depends on integration 
complexity and use of already-certified components.   
In addition to improved efficiencies, the RTP further demonstrated its 
effectiveness by meeting the project’s MOE, Probability of addressing all statutory and 
regulatory requirements to enable fielding of a new payload to the warfighter in 18 
months. The Team identified the certifications that caused elongation of the fielding 
timeline and examined alternative options that would also satisfy the project’s MOPs. 
MOP 1, Number of interim technical certifications, was achieved by using components 
that already had some of the required certifications. MOP 2, Median time to gain 
approval to field a new capability, was achieved by a reduction in the timeline through 
interim certifications, as described in the IRTR and LRTR strategies, resulting in 
integration within 14 to 92 weeks. Because a sufficient decrease in the schedule was 
obtained through interim approvals, the effects and risks of waivers from the applicable 
certifications were determined to be unnecessary, and therefore not incorporated into the 
timeline reduction strategies. 
B. TIMELINE REDUCTION OPTIONS 
The RTP, through use of the Payload Integration Checklist (Appendix H) and the 
Payload Integration Schedule (Appendix I), can achieve comprehensive integration of a 
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new capability. But some certifications could delay fielding due to the workload and 
extensive reviews conducted by external agencies. The Team identified the following 
applicable options (along with associated risks) to expedite the certification process:  
Spectrum 
Options 
1) Operate on a temporary frequency assignment. If a system operates on an 
“interim” stage three (3) frequency authorization, they can request local spectrum 
on a “not-to-interfere” basis. The stage 3 SPS submittal number will allow the 
user to obtain authorization to operate. It takes one (1) to two (2) months to get an 
SPS number; and one (1) to two (2) months to get local spectrum allocation.  
2) Limit payload selection to those that already have an SPS number or full spectrum 
authorization (J/F 12). Only a frequency allocation needs to be obtained and the 
time frame will shorten to one (1) to two (2) months. 
Risk 
1) Temporary frequency assignment. A “not-to-interfere” basis may limit the 
system’s operational availability, and thus, usefulness to the user. 
2) Limit payload selection. This may limit capabilities and cause potential 
integration issues. It may also reduce competition and increase system cost. 
CDL 
Options 
1. Limit payload selection to payloads that already have a CDL or use the existing 
communications architecture in the target platform. This automatically addresses 
the CDL requirement and time goes to zero (0). 
Risk 
1) This may limit capabilities and cause potential integration issues. It may also 





1) Limit payload selection to payloads that already have a SAASM GPS or use the 
existing navigation architecture in the target platform. This automatically 
addresses the SAASM GPS requirement and time goes to zero (0). 
Risk 
1) This may limit capabilities and cause potential integration issues. It may also 
reduce competition and increase system cost. 
T and E 
Options 
1) Conduct joint DT/OT. This will eliminate the lead-time between DT and OT. The 
OT testing time goes to zero (0) 
2) Conduct OT during a preliminary system fielding. Have users evaluate the system 
during operations. This will eliminate the OT lead time and testing time. 
Risk 
1) Joint DT / OT. The time to address any problems typically discovered in DT is 
removed. If an issue arises, it cannot be fixed before OT. 
2) Preliminary fielding OT. A problem may be discovered in the field or while on 
mission. Depending on the severity of the issue, the system may be useless or 
engineers may have to be sent into theater to investigate and fix the issue on site. 
JITC 
Options 
1) Obtain a limited JITC while conducting Tand E and training activities to support 
preliminary fielding. Full JITC certification is required for Initial Operational 
Capability (IOC), but not necessary for preliminary fielding. This will reduce the 
timeline to zero for JITC in the fielding path, allowing it to run parallel but 
independent of the rest of the certification work.  
Risk 
1) Operating without JITC certification limits the operation of the equipment. The 
system may not be allowed to connect to certain systems, and interoperability 





1) Obtain an Interim Authority To Operate (IATO). This is a temporary 
authorization to operate a system under the conditions or constraints enumerated 
in the accreditation decision while managing IA security weaknesses. An IATO is 
only good for 180 days from the authorization date and can be obtained within 30 
days.   
Risk 
1) The system may have insufficient security protection and may be susceptible to 
compromise by an unauthorized user. 
Battery 
Options 
1) Limit payload selection to payloads that already have a NOSSA approval. This 
automatically addresses the battery certification and time goes to zero (0). 
2) Obtain an interim approval to operate the subject battery for a limited amount of 
time. This will authorize fielding of the payload while NOSSA conducts its 
testing/analysis in parallel.    
Risk 
1) Limited payload selection. This may limit capabilities and cause potential 
integration issues. It may also reduce competition and increase system cost. 
2) Interim approval. The battery may be utilized in a manner that could be harmful 
to personnel and equipment within its vicinity. The battery may fail certification 
and have to be retrofitted in the field. There is also the possibility of decreased 
availability and increased maintenance due to battery failures in the field, driving 
up life cycle cost.   
Airworthiness 
Options 
1) Obtain a Cat III interim flight clearance (IFC). This reduces the amount of data 





1) Without sufficient data/documentation, an IFC can be released with very stringent 
limitations and restrictions, creating a relatively small envelope in which the 
system can be operated. This would limit the warfighter’s ability to complete the 
mission.   Expanding the operating envelope without sufficient testing could result 
in injury to personnel or loss of life/property. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The trade study looked for ways to optimize and balance the three (3) pillars of 
SE, maintain SE discipline, and meet rapid integration timelines. The RAIN Team 
recommends the IRTR strategy as the best option to meet a rapid fielding decision 
timeline. Three (3) integration strategies were analyzed based on the timeline reduction 
options outlined in Section B above. The first strategy, Baseline, focused on a purely 
technical solution and pursued full certifications for all applicable requirements. The 
second strategy, LRTR, focused on an optimal schedule with the shortest timeline 
possible. The third strategy, IRTR, looked at applying balance of the systems engineering 




Figure 35:  (Risk) Schedule Summary Results 
 
 The Baseline option was rejected based on its inability to meet a feilding decision 
timeline of 18 months despite offering the least ammount of technical risk. The LRTR 
option was identified as a suitable option to meet timelines while minimizing technical 
risk; however, it was also rejected as the optimal solution because it overly sacrificed 
technical capability through the inflexible payload options for schedule optimizations. 
But in extremely compressed situations, the LRTR strategy may be a viable, yet 
restrictive option. 
 The IRTR stratagy was determined to be the optimal SE approach because it 
balanced the three (3) pillars of SE and supported a fielding decision timeline inside 18 
months in a majority (7 or 9) of the scenarios. This stratagy significantly reduced the 
average cost and schedule to integrate and field a new payload, while still managing 
technical risk. While this strategy does not provide the fastest option, it does provide a 
suitable fielding timeline for reasonable cost and acceptably mitigating technical and 
operational risk. From a practical aspect this is also the most realistic scenairo. 
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D. AREAS OF FUTURE STUDY 
Although the scope of this project was limited to modular payloads for existing 
PMA-263 UAS inventory, the applicability of the RTP can be expanded further. The RTP 
can be implemented on the certification of entire platforms and payloads that require 
modification of the current system configuration. In addition, the Team identified the 
following areas that could benefit from additional investigation:   
• Applicability of RTP to other areas of NAVAIR. This could be applied in other 
PEOs or competencies, where technologies need to be fielded rapidly or more 
efficiently to minimize schedule or costs.  
• Research the individual certification processes to identify areas for efficiencies in 
terms of cost and schedule. Apply the RTP to each of the certifications for better 
implementation.  
• Update the model and simulation to provide results for pursuing waivers instead 
of full or interim certifications. 
• Build a tool that takes the users responses to questions about the system and 
produces an ordered list of certifications to complete, and an 80th percentile plan 
for schedule and cost. 
• The same process can be expanded to include logistical support. 
• Implementation on actual payload integration efforts needs to be conducted to 
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APPENDIX A. MISSION PROFILES 
 
Design Reference Missions 
Full Certification 
Waiver or Interim Certification 
























APPENDIX B. ARCHITECTURE AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
0 REQUIREMENTS 
CONTEXT 
These are the requirements for the system 
architecture. The system is the solution under 
development or analysis. This will cover inside 
and outside the system boundary (may be a 
System of Systems). The higher level 
requirements trace back to the capabilities. 
Requirements are decomposed from high level 
solution-neutral capabilities and requirements 
all the way down to solution-oriented system 
specifications. 
 1 INPUT/OUTPUT 
REQUIREMENTS 







0 STUAS System 
1 INPUT/OUTPUT 
REQUIREMENTS 
The system shall input and output all data 
required in this section to support integration 











1.2 Collect Certifications 
1.3 Analyze Certifications 
1.4 Address Risk 
1.5 Develop Certification 
Package 
1.1 INPUT The system shall input all data required in this 
sections below to support integration and 
fielding of payloads on STUAS at the Mission, 





1.1.2 Technical Data Package 
1.1.3 Technical Guidance 
from Certification Authority 
1.1.4 Payload Returned from 
Testing 
1.1.5 T&E Results Summary 
1.1.6 Packages from 
Technical Certification 
1.2.1 Assemble Data Item 
1.2.2 Perform Authority 
Officer 




Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
Authorities 
1.1.7 System Requirements 




1.1.2 Technical Data 
Package 
The system shall input Technical Data 
Packages to support certification 
1.1 INPUT 1.1.2.1 Design Description 
1.1.2.2 Payload Data 
1.2.3 Perform Data 
Collection 
1.2.3.1 Collect Safety 
Certification Data 








1.1.2.1 Design Description A technical description of the payload covering 
fit, form, function, and how it interfaces. 
1.1.2 Technical Data 
Package 
1.1.2.1.1 System Trigger 1.2.3.1.1 Collect 
Airworthiness 
Certifications Data 
1.2.3.1.2 Collect Battery 
Certifications Data 
1.2.3.1.3 Collect Laser 
Certifications Data 
1.2.3.1.4 Collect Weapon 
Certifications Data 
1.2.3.1.5 Collect System 
Safety Certifications Data 
1.2.3.1.6 Collect Range 
Safety Certification Data 
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Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
1.2.3.1.7 Collect E3 
Certification Data 
1.2.3.2.1 Collect IA 
Certifications Data 
1.2.3.2.2 Collect Anti-
Tamper Certifications Data 
1.2.3.2.3 Collect SAASM 
Certifications Data 
1.2.3.2.4 Collect Clinger-
Cohen Act Certifications 
Data 
1.2.3.3.1 Collect Spectrum 
Certifications Data 
1.2.3.3.2 Collect CDL 
Certifications Data 





1.2.3.4.2 Collect T&E 
Certifications Data 
1.1.2.1.1 System Trigger The system shall be initiated by the receipt of a 
first article and design description. 
1.1.2.1 Design 
Description 
 1 Perform Rain Integration 
Process 
1.1.2.2 Payload Data The data about the payload that is needed for 
certification. 
1.1.2 Technical Data 
Package 
1.1.2.2.1 Data for Each Type 
of Certification 
1.2.3.1 Collect Safety 
Certification Data 











1.1.2.2.1 Data for Each Type 
of Certification 
The system shall support inputting all data for 
each certification. 





1.2.3.1.2 Collect Battery 
Certifications Data 
1.2.3.1.3 Collect Laser 
Certifications Data 
1.2.3.1.4 Collect Weapon 
Certifications Data 
1.2.3.1.5 Collect System 
Safety Certifications Data 
1.2.3.1.6 Collect Range 
Safety Certification Data 
1.2.3.1.7 Collect E3 
Certification Data 
1.2.3.2.1 Collect IA 
Certifications Data 
1.2.3.2.2 Collect Anti-
Tamper Certifications Data 
1.2.3.2.3 Collect SAASM 
Certifications Data 
1.2.3.2.4 Collect Clinger-
Cohen Act Certifications 
Data 
1.2.3.3.1 Collect Spectrum 
Certifications Data 




Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 









Data for Individual 
Certification 
The system shall input all data for each 
certification required for specific payload 
integration and fielding as identified by the 
certification authority. 
1.1.2.2.1 Data for 
Each Type of 
Certification 
 1.2.3.1.1 Collect 
Airworthiness 
Certifications Data 
1.2.3.1.2 Collect Battery 
Certifications Data 
1.2.3.1.3 Collect Laser 
Certifications Data 
1.2.3.1.4 Collect Weapon 
Certifications Data 
1.2.3.1.5 Collect System 
Safety Certifications Data 
1.2.3.1.6 Collect Range 
Safety Certification Data 
1.2.3.1.7 Collect E3 
Certification Data 
1.2.3.2.1 Collect IA 
Certifications Data 
1.2.3.2.2 Collect Anti-
Tamper Certifications Data 
1.2.3.2.3 Collect SAASM 
Certifications Data 
1.2.3.2.4 Collect Clinger-




Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
1.2.3.3.1 Collect Spectrum 
Certifications Data 
1.2.3.3.2 Collect CDL 
Certifications Data 





1.2.3.4.2 Collect T&E 
Certifications Data 
1.1.3 Technical Guidance 
from Certification 
Authority 
The system shall input data from each technical 
certification authority to identify payload 
specific data and certification applicability. 









1.1.2.1.2 Address Battery 
Certifications 
1.1.2.1.3 Address Laser 
Certifications 
1.1.2.1.4 Address Weapon 
Certifications 
1.1.2.1.5 Address System 
Safety Certifications 
1.1.2.1.6 Address Range 
Safety Certifications 
1.1.2.1.7 Address E3 
 89 
 
Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
Certifications 
1.1.2.2 Determine Security 
Certifications 




1.1.2.2.3 Address SAASM 
Certifications 
1.1.2.2.4 Address Clinger-






1.1.2.3.2 Address CDL 
Certifications 








1.1.2.4.2 Address T&E 
Certifications 
1.3 Analyze Certifications 
1.3.1 Specify Data 
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Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
1.3.2 Provide Analysis 





1.3.2.1.2 Analyze Battery 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.3 Analyze Laser 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.4 Analyze Weapon 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.5 Analyze System 
Safety Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.6 Analyze Range 
Safety Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.7 Analyze E3 
Certification Data 
1.3.2.2 Analyze Security 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.2.1 Analyze IA 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.2.2 Analyze Anti-
Tamper Certifications Data 
1.3.2.2.3 Analyze SAASM 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.2.4 Analyze Clinger-











1.3.2.3.2 Analyze CDL 
Certifications Data 








1.3.2.4.2 Analyze T&E 
Certifications Data 
1.1.4 Payload Returned 
from Testing 
The system shall input technical data captured 
during all testing 
1.1 INPUT  1.3.2 Provide Analysis 





1.3.2.1.2 Analyze Battery 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.3 Analyze Laser 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.4 Analyze Weapon 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.5 Analyze System 
Safety Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.6 Analyze Range 
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Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
Safety Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.7 Analyze E3 
Certification Data 
1.3.2.2 Analyze Security 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.2.1 Analyze IA 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.2.2 Analyze Anti-
Tamper Certifications Data 
1.3.2.2.3 Analyze SAASM 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.2.4 Analyze Clinger-








1.3.2.3.2 Analyze CDL 
Certifications Data 












Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
1.3.3 Address Data 
Distribution 
1.1.5 T&E Results 
Summary 
The summary of the test and evaluation results. 1.1 INPUT 1.1.5.1 Collection of Test 
Reports 
1.3 Analyze Certifications 
1.1.5.1 Collection of Test 
Reports 
The collection of all test reports. 1.1.5 T&E Results 
Summary 
1.1.5.1.1 Test Reports for 
Each Area 
1.3.1 Specify Data 
1.3.2 Provide Analysis 
1.3.3 Address Data 
Distribution 
1.1.5.1.1 Test Reports for 
Each Area 
The system shall support inputting all test 
reports for each certification. 
1.1.5.1 Collection of 
Test Reports 
1.1.5.1.1.1 Test Reports for 
Each Certification (as 
applicable) 
1.3.2.1 Analyze Safety 
Certification Data 










Test Reports for 
Each Certification 
(as applicable) 
The system shall input all test reports for each 
certification required for specific payload 
integration and fielding as identified by the 
certification authority. 
1.1.5.1.1 Test 
Reports for Each 
Area 
 1.3.2.1.1 Analyze 
Airworthiness 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.2 Analyze Battery 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.3 Analyze Laser 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.4 Analyze Weapon 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.5 Analyze System 
Safety Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.6 Analyze Range 
Safety Certifications Data 
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Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
1.3.2.1.7 Analyze E3 
Certification Data 
1.3.2.2.1 Analyze IA 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.2.2 Analyze Anti-
Tamper Certifications Data 
1.3.2.2.3 Analyze SAASM 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.2.4 Analyze Clinger-





1.3.2.3.2 Analyze CDL 
Certifications Data 





1.3.2.4.2 Analyze T&E 
Certifications Data 




The complete set of results from the technical 
certification authorities for all sought 
certifications along with a summary of the 
results. 
1.1 INPUT 1.1.6.1 Collection of 
Certification Results 
1.3 Analyze Certifications 
1.1.6.1 Collection of 
Certification 
Results 
The system shall input the results of each 
certification request. 




1.1.6.1.1 Certification Results 
for Each Area 
1.3.1 Specify Data 
1.3.2 Provide Analysis 




Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
1.1.6.1.1 Certification 
Results for Each 
Area 
The system shall input overall Safety, Security, 
Interoperability, and Compatibility. 
1.1.6.1 Collection of 
Certification Results 
1.1.6.1.1.1 Certification 
Results for Each Type 
1.3.2.1 Analyze Safety 
Certification Data 











Results for Each 
Type 
The system shall input all certification results 
for each certification required for specific 
payload integration and fielding as identified by 
the certification authority. 
1.1.6.1.1 
Certification Results 






1.3.2.1.2 Analyze Battery 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.3 Analyze Laser 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.4 Analyze Weapon 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.5 Analyze System 
Safety Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.6 Analyze Range 
Safety Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.7 Analyze E3 
Certification Data 
1.3.2.2.1 Analyze IA 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.2.2 Analyze Anti-
Tamper Certifications Data 




Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
1.3.2.2.4 Analyze Clinger-





1.3.2.3.2 Analyze CDL 
Certifications Data 











The results from an individual certification 
effort and request. 
1.1.6.1.1.1 
Certification Results 
for Each Type 
 1.3.2.1.1 Analyze 
Airworthiness 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.2 Analyze Battery 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.3 Analyze Laser 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.4 Analyze Weapon 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.5 Analyze System 
Safety Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.6 Analyze Range 
Safety Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.7 Analyze E3 
Certification Data 
1.3.2.2.1 Analyze IA 
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Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.2.2 Analyze Anti-
Tamper Certifications Data 
1.3.2.2.3 Analyze SAASM 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.2.4 Analyze Clinger-





1.3.2.3.2 Analyze CDL 
Certifications Data 









The system shall input the payload mission 
requirements. 
1.1 INPUT  1.1 Determine 
Certifications 
1.2 Collect Certifications 
1.3 Analyze Certifications 
1.4 Address Risk 
1.5 Develop Certification 
Package 
1.2 OUTPUT The system shall output all data required in this 
sections below to support integration and 
fielding of payloads on STUAS at the Mission, 
Stakeholder, System, Component, and 
1 INPUT/OUTPUT 
REQUIREMENTS 
1.2.1 Fielding Decision 
Support Package 
1.2.2 T&E Supplies 
1.4 Address Risk 




Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
Configuration levels. 1.2.3 Design Guidance to 
Developer 
1.2.4 Request for More Data 
to Developer 
1.2.5 Certification Approval 
Request 
1.2.6 Packages for 
Certification (Initial & 
Update) 
1.2.7 Risk Assessment 
1.2.1 Fielding Decision 
Support Package 
Documentation that shows that the payload 
works as intended; lists all required 
certifications; shows that the listed 
certifications and approvals have been granted 
in full, or as interims, or have been waived by 
suitable authority. This is composed of an 
overarching summary with details attached as 
appendices. 
1.2 OUTPUT  1.4 Address Risk 
1.5 Develop Certification 
Package 
1.2.2 T&E Supplies Materials and labor that RAIN needs to supply 
to the T&E facilities and organizations. 
1.2 OUTPUT 1.2.2.1 T&E Support Request 1.3 Analyze Certifications 
1.2.2.1 T&E Support 
Request 
The system shall output a T&E support request. 1.2.2 T&E Supplies 1.2.2.1.1 Payload to T&E 1.3.2 Provide Analysis 
1.2.2.1.1 Payload to T&E The system shall provide an integrated payload, 
with necessary certifications to support testing. 
1.2.2.1 T&E Support 
Request 
1.2.2.1.1.1 Direction to T&E 1.3.2.1 Analyze Safety 
Certification Data 










Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
1.2.2.1.1.
1 
Direction to T&E The system shall output the needed testing data 
to develop test plans. 
1.2.2.1.1 Payload to 
T&E 
 1.3.2.1.1 Analyze 
Airworthiness 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.2 Analyze Battery 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.3 Analyze Laser 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.4 Analyze Weapon 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.5 Analyze System 
Safety Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.6 Analyze Range 
Safety Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.7 Analyze E3 
Certification Data 
1.3.2.2.1 Analyze IA 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.2.2 Analyze Anti-
Tamper Certifications Data 
1.3.2.2.3 Analyze SAASM 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.2.4 Analyze Clinger-





1.3.2.3.2 Analyze CDL 
Certifications Data 





Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
Environmental 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.4.2 Analyze T&E 
Certifications Data 
1.2.3 Design Guidance to 
Developer 
The system shall output the needed design 
changes to meet certifications. 
1.2 OUTPUT  1.3 Analyze Certifications 
1.2.4 Request for More 
Data to Developer 
The system shall output additional data need to 
complete certifications. 
1.2 OUTPUT  1.1 Determine 
Certifications 
1.2 Collect Certifications 
1.3 Analyze Certifications 
1.4 Address Risk 




The system shall output the request to the 
certification approval authority when all 
technical data has been provided. 
1.2 OUTPUT  1.5 Develop Certification 
Package 





1.5.1.2 Develop Battery 
Certifications Package 
1.5.1.3 Develop Laser 
Certifications Package 
1.5.1.4 Develop Weapon 
Certifications Package 
1.5.1.5 Develop System 
Safety Certifications 
Package 




Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
Package 
1.5.1.7 Develop E3 
Certification Package 
1.5.2 Develop Security 
Certifications Package 





1.5.2.3 Develop SAASM 
Certifications Package 
1.5.2.4 Develop Clinger-





1.5.3.1 Develop Spectrum 
Certifications Package 
1.5.3.2 Develop CDL 
Certifications Package 












Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
1.2.6 Packages for 
Certification (Initial 
& Update) 
The collection of documentation needed to 
apply for and support the required 
certifications. 
1.2 OUTPUT 1.2.6.1 Initial Data Package 
for Certification 
1.2.6.2 Updated Data Package 
for Certification 
1.5 Develop Certification 
Package 
1.2.6.1 Initial Data Package 
for Certification 
The system shall output data packages to the 
certification approval authority for initial 
certification request. 
1.2.6 Packages for 
Certification (Initial 
& Update) 
 1.5.1 Develop Safety 
Certification Package 








1.2.6.2 Updated Data 
Package for 
Certification 
The system shall output data packages updates 
to the certification approval authority as 
required and upon request. 
1.2.6 Packages for 
Certification (Initial 
& Update) 
 1.5.1.1 Develop 
Airworthiness 
Certifications Package 
1.5.1.2 Develop Battery 
Certifications Package 
1.5.1.3 Develop Laser 
Certifications Package 
1.5.1.4 Develop Weapon 
Certifications Package 
1.5.1.5 Develop System 
Safety Certifications 
Package 
1.5.1.6 Develop Range 
Safety Certifications 
Package 
1.5.1.7 Develop E3 
Certification Package 
1.5.2.1 Develop IA 
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1.5.2.3 Develop SAASM 
Certifications Package 
1.5.2.4 Develop Clinger-
Cohen Act Certifications 
Package 
1.5.3.1 Develop Spectrum 
Certifications Package 
1.5.3.2 Develop CDL 
Certifications Package 





1.5.4.2 Develop T&E 
Certifications Package 
1.2.7 Risk Assessment The assessment of the residual risk including 
performance, cost, schedule, and safety. 
1.2 OUTPUT  1.4 Address Risk 





1.4.1.2 Address Battery 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.1.3 Address Laser 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.1.4 Address Weapon 
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Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.1.5 Address System 
Safety Certifications Risk 
1.4.1.6 Address Range 
Safety Certifications Risk 
1.4.1.7 Address E3 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.2 Address Security 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.2.1 Address IA 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.2.2 Address Anti-
Tamper Certifications Risk 
1.4.2.3 Address SAASM 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.2.4 Address Clinger-





1.4.3.1 Address Spectrum 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.3.2 Address CDL 
Certifications Risk 









Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
Certifications Risk 




The system shall interface with all external 
entities need for payload intergration, 





1.3.3 Certification Authorities 
1.3.4 Developer 
0 STUAS System 
1 Perform Rain Integration 
Process 
EXT.1 Address PMA-263 
Activities 









EXT.5 Field Payload 








EXT.1.3 Develop Payload 
EXT.1.4 Provide System 
Integration 
EXT.5 Field Payload 








The system shall interface with all 
representatives required for system 
1.3 EXTERNAL 
INTERFACE 












The system shall interface with NAVAIR and 
DoD SMEs as need for certification. 
1.3.3 Certification 
Authorities 
 EXT.4 Perform 
Certifications Review 




 EXT.1 Address PMA-263 
Activities 
EXT.5 Field Payload 
1.4 FUNCTIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS 
The system shall support the payload meeting 
all functional requirements outlined below for 
certification and operation. 
1 INPUT/OUTPUT 
REQUIREMENTS 
1.4.1 Show Payload Is Ready 
to be Fielded 
1 Perform Rain Integration 
Process 
1.4.1 Show Payload Is 
Ready to be Fielded 
The system shall provide a means to show a 
payload is ready to be fielded. 
1.4 FUNCTIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS 
1.4.1.1 Comply Payload with 
Statutes and Regulations 
1.4.1.2 Provide Information 
Needed to Prove 
Interoperability 
1.4.1.3 Provide Information 
Needed to Prove Safety 
1.4.1.4 Provide Information 
Needed to Prove Security 
1.4.1.5 Provide Information 
Needed to Prove 
Environmental Compatibility 
1.4 Address Risk 
1.5 Develop Certification 
Package 
1.4.1.1 Comply Payload 
with Statutes and 
Regulations 
The system shall provide a means to have the 
payload comply with statutes and regulations. 
1.4.1 Show Payload 




1.4.1.1.2 Collect Data to 
Support Certification 
1.4.1.1.3 Evaluate Pre-
Submission Certification Data 
Package 
1.4.1.1.4 Means to Use to 




Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 





The system shall provide a means to determine 
the certifications needed based on the 





1.4.1.1.1.1 Provide Means to 






Provide Means to 
Track That All 
Certifications Are 
Addressed 
The system shall provide a means to track that 








1.1.3 Sort Certification List 
1.4.1.1.2 Collect Data to 
Support 
Certification 
The system shall provide a means to collect the 






 1.2.3 Perform Data 
Collection 
1.2.3.1 Collect Safety 
Certification Data 












The system shall provide a means to evaluate 
the pre-submission data package for each 





 1.3.2 Provide Analysis 









Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
1.3.2.1.3 Analyze Laser 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.4 Analyze Weapon 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.5 Analyze System 
Safety Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.6 Analyze Range 
Safety Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.7 Analyze E3 
Certification Data 
1.3.2.2 Analyze Security 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.2.1 Analyze IA 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.2.2 Analyze Anti-
Tamper Certifications Data 
1.3.2.2.3 Analyze SAASM 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.2.4 Analyze Clinger-








1.3.2.3.2 Analyze CDL 
Certifications Data 











1.3.2.4.2 Analyze T&E 
Certifications Data 
1.4.1.1.4 Means to Use to 
Interface with Tech 
Cert Authorities 
The system shall provide the means of 






1.4.1.1.4.1 Provide Process 
for Complying with Tech Cert 
Authority Guidance 
1.5 Develop Certification 
Package 
1.5.1 Develop Safety 
Certification Package 










Provide Process for 
Complying with 
Tech Cert Authority 
Guidance 
The system shall provide the process for 
complying with the guidance from the technical 
certification authority. 
1.4.1.1.4 Means to 




Risk Level from Use 
of Waiver & Interim 
Approvals 
 1.5.1.1 Develop 
Airworthiness 
Certifications Package 
1.5.1.2 Develop Battery 
Certifications Package 
1.5.1.3 Develop Laser 
Certifications Package 
1.5.1.4 Develop Weapon 
Certifications Package 
1.5.1.5 Develop System 
Safety Certifications 
Package 
1.5.1.6 Develop Range 
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Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
Safety Certifications 
Package 
1.5.1.7 Develop E3 
Certification Package 





1.5.2.3 Develop SAASM 
Certifications Package 
1.5.2.4 Develop Clinger-
Cohen Act Certifications 
Package 
1.5.3.1 Develop Spectrum 
Certifications Package 
1.5.3.2 Develop CDL 
Certifications Package 





1.5.4.2 Develop T&E 
Certifications Package 
1.4.1.2 Provide Information 
Needed to Prove 
Interoperability 
The system shall provide the information 
needed to prove Interoperability. 
1.4.1 Show Payload 
Is Ready to be 
Fielded 





1.1.2.3.2 Address CDL 
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Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
Certifications 





1.2.3.3.1 Collect Spectrum 
Certifications Data 
1.2.3.3.2 Collect CDL 
Certifications Data 








1.3.2.3.2 Analyze CDL 
Certifications Data 





1.4.3.1 Address Spectrum 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.3.2 Address CDL 
Certifications Risk 





Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
Interoperability 
Certification Package 
1.5.3.1 Develop Spectrum 
Certifications Package 
1.5.3.2 Develop CDL 
Certifications Package 
1.5.3.3 Develop JITC 
Certifications Package 
1.4.1.3 Provide Information 
Needed to Prove 
Safety 
The system shall provide the information 
needed to prove Safety. 
1.4.1 Show Payload 
Is Ready to be 
Fielded 





1.1.2.1.2 Address Battery 
Certifications 
1.1.2.1.3 Address Laser 
Certifications 
1.1.2.1.4 Address Weapon 
Certifications 
1.1.2.1.5 Address System 
Safety Certifications 





1.2.3.1.2 Collect Battery 
Certifications Data 
1.2.3.1.3 Collect Laser 
Certifications Data 
1.2.3.1.4 Collect Weapon 
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Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
Certifications Data 
1.2.3.1.5 Collect System 
Safety Certifications Data 





1.3.2.1.2 Analyze Battery 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.3 Analyze Laser 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.4 Analyze Weapon 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.1.5 Analyze System 
Safety Certifications Data 





1.4.1.2 Address Battery 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.1.3 Address Laser 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.1.4 Address Weapon 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.1.5 Address System 
Safety Certifications Risk 








1.5.1.2 Develop Battery 
Certifications Package 
1.5.1.3 Develop Laser 
Certifications Package 
1.5.1.4 Develop Weapon 
Certifications Package 
1.5.1.5 Develop System 
Safety Certifications 
Package 
1.4.1.4 Provide Information 
Needed to Prove 
Security 
The system shall provide the information 
needed to prove Security. 
1.4.1 Show Payload 
Is Ready to be 
Fielded 
 1.1.2.2 Determine Security 
Certifications 




1.1.2.2.3 Address SAASM 
Certifications 
1.1.2.2.4 Address Clinger-
Cohen Act Certifications 
1.2.3.2 Collect Security 
Certification Data 
1.2.3.2.1 Collect IA 
Certifications Data 
1.2.3.2.2 Collect Anti-
Tamper Certifications Data 





Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
Cohen Act Certifications 
Data 
1.3.2.2 Analyze Security 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.2.1 Analyze IA 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.2.2 Analyze Anti-
Tamper Certifications Data 
1.3.2.2.3 Analyze SAASM 
Certifications Data 
1.3.2.2.4 Analyze Clinger-
Cohen Act Certifications 
Data 
1.4.2 Address Security 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.2.1 Address IA 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.2.2 Address Anti-
Tamper Certifications Risk 
1.4.2.3 Address SAASM 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.2.4 Address Clinger-
Cohen Act Certifications 
Risk 
1.5.2 Develop Security 
Certifications Package 





1.5.2.3 Develop SAASM 
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Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
Certifications Package 
1.5.2.4 Develop Clinger-
Cohen Act Certifications 
Package 
1.4.1.5 Provide Information 
Needed to Prove 
Environmental 
Compatibility 
The system shall provide the information 
needed to prove Environmental Compatibility. 
1.4.1 Show Payload 
Is Ready to be 
Fielded 




























1.4.4.2 Address T&E 
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1.5.4.2 Develop T&E 
Certifications Package 
2 TECHNOLOGY & 
SYSTEM-WIDE 
REQUIREMENTS 
The system shall include system Technology; 
Suitability and Quality; Cost; Schedule to 





2.2 SUITABILITY & 
QUALITY 
2.3 COST REQUIERMENTS 
2.4 SCHEDULE 
REQUIREMENTS 











2.1.3 MS Office 
2.1.4 PMA-263 Database(s) 
1 Perform Rain Integration 
Process 
2.1.1 NMCI the computer network based information 
exchange shall operate within the limits of what 
the NMCI will allow or support. 
2.1 TECHNOLOGY 
CONSTRAINTS 
 1 Perform Rain Integration 
Process 
2.1.2 Email Written communication of the system 




 1 Perform Rain Integration 
Process 
2.1.3 MS Office The system documentation shall be limited to 
being in MS Office formats (MS Word 2003, 








Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
2.1.4 PMA-263 
Database(s) 
File sharing shall be limited to PMA-263 and 
DoD approved contractor databases. 
2.1 TECHNOLOGY 
CONSTRAINTS 
 1 Perform Rain Integration 
Process 
2.2 SUITABILITY & 
QUALITY 
The system shall support the following 





2.2.1 Produces Complete 
Decision Package 
2.2.2 Produces Accurate 
Decision Package 
1 Perform Rain Integration 
Process 
2.2.1 Produces Complete 
Decision Package 




2.2.1.1 Addresses All 
Relevant Statutes and 
Regulations 
2.2.1.2 Justifies Omitted 
Statutes or Regulations 
1.1 Determine 
Certifications 
1.4 Address Risk 
1.5 Develop Certification 
Package 
2.2.1.1 Addresses All 
Relevant Statutes 
and Regulations 





2.2.1.1.1 Tailored List of 
Required Certs by Payload 
System Type 
2.2.1.1.2 Certifications, 
Approvals, Letter, or Waiver 
for All Required Statutes & 
Regulations 
2.2.1.1.3 Instructions on The 
Order & Start Times for Each 
Cert 
2.2.1.1.4 Aggregated Risk 
Level from Use of Waiver & 
Interim Approvals 
1.1.2.1 Determine Safety 
Certifications 








1.4.1 Address Safety 
Certifications Risk 










Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
1.5.1 Develop Safety 
Certification Package 








2.2.1.1.1 Tailored List of 
Required Certs by 
Payload System 
Type 
The system shall provide a tailored list of 
required certs by payload system type. 
2.2.1.1 Addresses 
All Relevant Statutes 
and Regulations 
 1.1.2.1.1 Address 
Airworthiness 
Certifications 
1.1.2.1.2 Address Battery 
Certifications 
1.1.2.1.3 Address Laser 
Certifications 
1.1.2.1.4 Address Weapon 
Certifications 
1.1.2.1.5 Address System 
Safety Certifications 
1.1.2.1.6 Address Range 
Safety Certifications 
1.1.2.1.7 Address E3 
Certifications 








Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
1.1.2.2.4 Address Clinger-
Cohen Act Certifications 
1.1.2.3.1 Address 
Spectrum Certifications 
1.1.2.3.2 Address CDL 
Certifications 









or Waiver for All 
Required Statutes & 
Regulations 
The system shall provide the Certifications, 
approvals, letter, or waiver for all required 
statutes and regulations. 
2.2.1.1 Addresses 
All Relevant Statutes 
and Regulations 
 1.5.1.1 Develop 
Airworthiness 
Certifications Package 
1.5.1.2 Develop Battery 
Certifications Package 
1.5.1.3 Develop Laser 
Certifications Package 
1.5.1.4 Develop Weapon 
Certifications Package 
1.5.1.5 Develop System 
Safety Certifications 
Package 
1.5.1.6 Develop Range 
Safety Certifications 
Package 
1.5.1.7 Develop E3 
Certification Package 
1.5.2.1 Develop IA 
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1.5.2.3 Develop SAASM 
Certifications Package 
1.5.2.4 Develop Clinger-
Cohen Act Certifications 
Package 
1.5.3.1 Develop Spectrum 
Certifications Package 
1.5.3.2 Develop CDL 
Certifications Package 





1.5.4.2 Develop T&E 
Certifications Package 
2.2.1.1.3 Instructions on The 
Order & Start 
Times for Each Cert 
The system shall provide instructions on the 
order and relative start times for each 
certification. 
2.2.1.1 Addresses 
All Relevant Statutes 
and Regulations 
 1.1.2.1.1 Address 
Airworthiness 
Certifications 
1.1.2.1.2 Address Battery 
Certifications 
1.1.2.1.3 Address Laser 
Certifications 
1.1.2.1.4 Address Weapon 
Certifications 




Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
1.1.2.1.6 Address Range 
Safety Certifications 
1.1.2.1.7 Address E3 
Certifications 




1.1.2.2.3 Address SAASM 
Certifications 
1.1.2.2.4 Address Clinger-
Cohen Act Certifications 
1.1.2.3.1 Address 
Spectrum Certifications 
1.1.2.3.2 Address CDL 
Certifications 





1.1.2.4.2 Address T&E 
Certifications 
2.2.1.1.4 Aggregated Risk 
Level from Use of 
Waiver & Interim 
Approvals 
The system shall provide aggregated risk level 
analysis from the use of the waiver and interim 
approvals. 
2.2.1.1 Addresses 
All Relevant Statutes 
and Regulations 
1.4.1.1.4.1 Provide Process 





1.4.1.2 Address Battery 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.1.3 Address Laser 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.1.4 Address Weapon 
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Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.1.5 Address System 
Safety Certifications Risk 
1.4.1.6 Address Range 
Safety Certifications Risk 
1.4.1.7 Address E3 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.2.1 Address IA 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.2.2 Address Anti-
Tamper Certifications Risk 
1.4.2.3 Address SAASM 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.2.4 Address Clinger-
Cohen Act Certifications 
Risk 
1.4.3.1 Address Spectrum 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.3.2 Address CDL 
Certifications Risk 









Instructions on The 
Risks of Using 
Waivers or Interim 
Approvals 
The system shall provide instructions on the 
risks level of using waivers or interim 
approvals. 
  1.4.1.1 Address 
Airworthiness 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.1.2 Address Battery 
 124 
 
Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.1.3 Address Laser 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.1.4 Address Weapon 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.1.5 Address System 
Safety Certifications Risk 
1.4.1.6 Address Range 
Safety Certifications Risk 
1.4.1.7 Address E3 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.2.1 Address IA 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.2.2 Address Anti-
Tamper Certifications Risk 
1.4.2.3 Address SAASM 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.2.4 Address Clinger-
Cohen Act Certifications 
Risk 
1.4.3.1 Address Spectrum 
Certifications Risk 
1.4.3.2 Address CDL 
Certifications Risk 









Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
2.2.1.2 Justifies Omitted 
Statutes or 
Regulations 
The system shall provide the justification for 











1.1.3 Sort Certification List 
2.2.2 Produces Accurate 
Decision Package 
The system shall produce complete accurate 
fielding decision packages. 
2.2 SUITABILITY 
& QUALITY 




1.2 Collect Certifications 
1.3 Analyze Certifications 
1.4 Address Risk 









2.3.1 Same or Lower Than 
Current Cost est<$2M 
1 Perform Rain Integration 
Process 
2.3.1 Same or Lower 
Than Current Cost 
est<$2M 
The system shall incur the same or lower costs 
as the current processes used to fully support 








The schedule requirements are detailed in the 




2.4.1 Less Than 18 Mths to 
Produce The Fielding 
Decision Package 
1 Perform Rain Integration 
Process 
2.4.1 Less Than 18 Mths 
to Produce The 
Fielding Decision 
Package 
The system shall provide an option to take 18 




 1 Perform Rain Integration 
Process 
3 TRADE-OFF The system shall address the fundamental 0 REQUIREMENTS 3.1 PERFORMANCE 1 Perform Rain Integration 
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Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
REQUIREMENTS objectives hierarchy indicate the weighted 
values for each bottom level objective for use in 
trading off features used during operations, but 
implemented during development and 
manufacturing. 
CONTEXT TRADE-OFF 






The system shall perform a trade-off analysis 
based on the factors identified in The systems 
fundamental objectives hierarchy. 
3 TRADE-OFF 
REQUIREMENTS 
3.1.1 Minimize Time to 
Address Statutory & 
Regulatory Requirements for 
Fielding 
3.1.2 Provide Means to 
Manage Risks 
1 Perform Rain Integration 
Process 





The system shall minimize time to address 





3.1.1.1 Minimize Time to 
Determine Certifications 
Required to Pursue 
3.1.1.2 Minimize Time to 
Address Required 
Certifications 
1 Perform Rain Integration 
Process 
3.1.1.1 Minimize Time to 
Determine 
Certifications 
Required to Pursue 
The system shall minimize time to determine 
certifications required to be pursued. 
3.1.1 Minimize Time 




3.1.1.1.1 Time to Determine 
Needed Certifications Value 
Curve Is Linear with a Value 
of 1 at One Day or Less & 
Zero at One Year 
1 Perform Rain Integration 
Process 
3.1.1.1.1 Time to Determine 
Needed 
Certifications Value 
Curve Is Linear 
with a Value of 1 at 
One Day or Less & 
Zero at One Year 
The system shall value the time to determine 
needed certifications with a value curve that is 
linear with a value of 1 at one day or less and 
zero at one year. 
3.1.1.1 Minimize 
Time to Determine 
Certifications 
Required to Pursue 
3.1.1.1.1.1 Weight 15% for 
Minimize Time to Determine 
Certifications 




Weight 15% for 
Minimize Time to 
Determine 
Certifications 
The system shall apply a trade weight of 15% 
to minimizing the time to determine required 
certifications when de-conflicting with other 
trade-off requirements. 
3.1.1.1.1 Time to 
Determine Needed 
Certifications Value 
Curve Is Linear with 
a Value of 1 at One 
Day or Less & Zero 




Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
at One Year 
3.1.1.2 Minimize Time to 
Address Required 
Certifications 
The system shall minimize time to address 
required certifications. 
3.1.1 Minimize Time 




3.1.1.2.1 Time to obtain 
waivers/interim approvals 
value curve is linear with a 
value of 1 at one day or less 
and zero at one year. 
3.1.1.2.2 Time to obtain full 
certification approvals value 
curve is linear with a value of 
1 at one day or less and zero 
at one year. 
1 Perform Rain Integration 
Process 
3.1.1.2.1 Time to obtain 
waivers/interim 
approvals value 
curve is linear with 
a value of 1 at one 
day or less and zero 
at one year. 
The system shall value the time to obtain 
waivers/interim approvals with a value curve 
that is linear with a value of 1 at one day or less 
and zero at one year. 
3.1.1.2 Minimize 
Time to Address 
Required 
Certifications 
3.1.1.2.1.1 Weight 35% for 
Minimize Time to Obtain 
Waiver/Interim Approvals. 




Weight 35% for 




The system shall apply a trade weight of 35% 
to minimizing the time to obtain 
waivers/interim approvals when de-conflicting 
with other trade-off requirements. 




curve is linear with a 
value of 1 at one day 
or less and zero at 
one year. 
 1 Perform Rain Integration 
Process 
3.1.1.2.2 Time to obtain full 
certification 
approvals value 
curve is linear with 
a value of 1 at one 
day or less and zero 
at one year. 
The system shall value the time to obtain full 
certification approvals with value curve that is 
linear with a value of 1 at one day or less and 
zero at one year. 
3.1.1.2 Minimize 
Time to Address 
Required 
Certifications 
3.1.1.2.2.1 Weight 35% for 
Minimize Time to Obtain Full 
Certification Approval 




Weight 35% for 
Minimize Time to 
Obtain Full 
The system shall apply a trade weight of 35% 
to minimizing the time to obtain full 
certification approvals when de-conflicting with 
3.1.1.2.2 Time to 
obtain full 
certification 




Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
Certification 
Approval 
other trade-off requirements. approvals value 
curve is linear with a 
value of 1 at one day 
or less and zero at 
one year. 
3.1.2 Provide Means to 
Manage Risks 





3.1.2.1 Minimize waivers and 
interim approvals 
1 Perform Rain Integration 
Process 
3.1.2.1 Minimize waivers 
and interim 
approvals 
The system shall minimize waivers and interim 
approvals. 
3.1.2 Provide Means 
to Manage Risks 
3.1.2.1.1 Percentage of 
waivers/interims value cure is 
linear with value of 1 at 0% 
and 0 at 100%. 
1 Perform Rain Integration 
Process 
3.1.2.1.1 Percentage of 
waivers/interims 
value cure is linear 
with value of 1 at 
0% and 0 at 100%. 
The system shall value the percentage of 
waivers/interims with a value cure that is linear 
with value of 1 at 0% and 0 at 100%. 
3.1.2.1 Minimize 
waivers and interim 
approvals 
3.1.2.1.1.1 Weight 15% 
Percentage of 
Waivers/Interims Approvals 








The system shall apply a trade weight of 15% 
to minimizing the percentage of 




value cure is linear 
with value of 1 at 0% 
and 0 at 100%. 




The first phase of this systems development 
shall not address this phase. 
3 TRADE-OFF 
REQUIREMENTS 
3.2.1 Cost 1 Perform Rain Integration 
Process 
3.2.1 Cost N/A. 3.2 COST TRADE-
OFF 





The first phase of this systems development 
shall not address this phase. 
3 TRADE-OFF 
REQUIREMENTS 
3.3.1 Cost-Performance 1 Perform Rain Integration 
Process 
3.3.1 Cost-Performance N/A. 3.3 COST-
PERFORMANCE 
TRADE-OFF 
 1 Perform Rain Integration 
Process 
4 QUALIFICATION Requirements on observing and collecting data 
from tests, how the collected data will be used 
0 REQUIREMENTS 4.1 OBSERVANCE 1 Perform Rain Integration 
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Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
REQUIREMENTS to verify the RAIN works as specified, how 
RAIN will be validated to meet user needs, and 











Data on the performance of the RAIN system 




4.1.1 Verification tests by 
development team 
4.1.2 Validation tests by user 
representatives 
1 Perform Rain Integration 
Process 
4.1.1 Verification tests by 
development team 
The system verification testing shall be 




 1 Perform Rain Integration 
Process 
4.1.2 Validation tests by 
user representatives 
The system validation testing shall be 
conducted by PMA-263 user representatives. 
4.1 OBSERVANCE 
REQUIREMENTS 




Verification of the performance of the RAIN 




4.2.1 Verify features against 
req doc 
1 Perform Rain Integration 
Process 
4.2.1 Verify features 
against req doc 
The system shall be verified by comparing the 




4.2.1.1 Verified when all 
requirements are met 
1 Perform Rain Integration 
Process 
4.2.1.1 Verified when all 
requirements are 
met 
The system shall be verified as being complete 
if it meets all the requirements listed in the 
operations phase of this requirements 
document. 
4.2.1 Verify features 
against req doc 




Validation of the performance of the RAIN 




4.3.1 Validate system 
functions against user needs 
1 Perform Rain Integration 
Process 
4.3.1 Validate system 
functions against 
user needs 
The system shall be validated as being correct 
by operating system and comparing its abilities 
against what the user needs. 
4.3 VALIDATION 
REQUIREMENTS 
4.3.1.1 Validated when all 
user needs are met 




Number Name Description refines refined by basis of 
4.3.1.1 Validated when all 
user needs are met 
The system shall be verified as being complete 
if it meets all the requirements listed in the 




against user needs 




Acceptance of the RAIN system shall be in 
accordance with the lower level requirements. 
4 QUALIFICATION 
REQUIREMENTS 
4.4.1 Acceptable if validation 
indicates needs are me 
1 Perform Rain Integration 
Process 
4.4.1 Acceptable if 
validation indicates 
needs are me 
The system shall be considered acceptable 
when the results of the validation testing 
indicate all user needs are addressed. 
4.4 ACCEPTANCE 
REQUIREMENTS 
4.4.1.1 Suggestions for 
improvements bound needs 
will be remanded for future 
projects 
1 Perform Rain Integration 
Process 
4.4.1.1 Suggestions for 
improvements 
bound needs will be 
remanded for future 
projects 
Suggestions for improving ease of use or speed 
of use of the system shall be recorded and 
remanded for future projects. 
4.4.1 Acceptable if 
validation indicates 
needs are me 












































































































































































































Naval Postgraduate School (N.P.S)
Date:















































Naval Postgraduate School (N.P.S)
Date:
July 20, 2013






















































Naval Postgraduate School (N.P.S)
Date:
July 20, 2013
































Naval Postgraduate School (N.P.S)
Date:
July 20, 2013





















Naval Postgraduate School (N.P.S)
Date:
July 20, 2013
















Naval Postgraduate School (N.P.S)
Date:
July 20, 2013


































































Naval Postgraduate School (N.P.S)
Date:
July 20, 2013



































Naval Postgraduate School (N.P.S)
Date:
July 20, 2013
























Naval Postgraduate School (N.P.S)
Date:
July 20, 2013













































Naval Postgraduate School (N.P.S)
Date:
July 20, 2013










































































Naval Postgraduate School (N.P.S)
Date:
July 20, 2013















Naval Postgraduate School (N.P.S)
Date:
July 20, 2013














































Naval Postgraduate School (N.P.S)
Date:
July 20, 2013












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX D. RESEARCH 
 
Certification Research Information 
































Figure 36:  Cost Model Research Matrix 
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APPENDIX F. MODELING AND SIMULATION 
RAIN Simulation Results 
 
Theoretical upper and lower bounds on completing all possible certifications for a 
STUAS payload 
• Serial Risk Simulator® and iGrafx® 




• LASER Designator Runs 1 though 3 
• Passive EW Runs 1 though 3 
• Active EW Runs 1 though 3 
 
Lead-time Reduction Simulations 
 
LASER Designator Timeline Reductions Runs 1 though 3 
• Low Risk Timeline Reduction (LRTR) 
• Intermediate Risk Timeline Reduction (IRTR) 
 
Passive EW Timeline Reductions Runs 1 though 3 
• Low Risk Timeline Reduction (LRTR) 
• Intermediate Risk Timeline Reduction (IRTR) 
 
Active EW Timeline Reductions Runs 1 though 3 
• Low Risk Timeline Reduction (LRTR) 




LASER Designator Runs 1 though 3 
• Baseline (BL) 
• Intermediate Risk Timeline Reduction (IRTR) 
• Low Risk Timeline Reduction (LRTR) 
 
Passive EW Runs 1 though 3 
• Baseline (BL) 
• Intermediate Risk Timeline Reduction (IRTR) 
• Low Risk Timeline Reduction (LRTR) 
 
Active EW Runs 1 though 3 
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• Baseline (BL) 
• Intermediate Risk Timeline Reduction (IRTR) 
• Low Risk Timeline Reduction (LRTR) 
 
 
1st Build of the Simulation: All Certifications in Series 
Risk Simulator® 
• Triangular distribution for each certification duration. 
• 34 Certifications 
Mean = 469 weeks  
• 109.4 months 
80th % = 498 weeks 
• 116.2 months 














Mean: 468 weeks 
• 109.2 months 
80th % = 495 weeks  






2nd Build of the Simulation: All Certifications in Series 
Risk Simulator® 
• Triangular distribution for each certification duration. 
• 34 Certifications. 
Mean = 70 weeks  
• 16.2 months 
80th % = 84 weeks 
• 19.4 months 



























































































































































































































2nd Build of the Simulation: All Certifications in Series 
iGrafx® Simulator 
 
Mean: 70 weeks 
• 16.2 months 
80th % = 81 weeks  
• 18.7 months 








LASER Designator Runs 1 though 3 
Passive EW Runs 1 though 3 








































































































































































































































Active EW Runs 1 through 3 Baseline 
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Lead-time Reduction Simulations 
 
LASER Designator Timeline Reductions Runs 1 through 3 
• Intermediate Risk Timeline Reduction (IRTR) 
• Low Risk Timeline Reduction (LRTR) 
 
Passive EW Timeline Reductions 
• Low Risk Timeline Reduction (LRTR) Runs 1 though 3 
• Intermediate Risk Timeline Reduction (IRTR) Runs 1 though 3 
 
Active EW Timeline Reductions 
• Low Risk Timeline Reduction (LRTR) Runs 1 though 3 





LASER Designator Run 1 
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LASER Designator Run 1 



































LASER Designator Run 2 


















LASER Designator Run 2 






























































LASER Designator Run 3 












LASER Designator Run 3 


















Passive Electronic Warfare (EW) Run 1 












Passive Electronic Warfare (EW) Run 1 












Passive Electronic Warfare (EW) Run 2 














Passive Electronic Warfare (EW) Run 2 
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Passive Electronic Warfare (EW) Run 3 
















Passive Electronic Warfare (EW) Run 3 
















Active Electronic Warfare (EW) Run 1 








Elapsed Time in Weeks
46019.83











Activity Statistics In Weeks (Hours)
CDL
SAASM HAE
HERO  Testing Lead Time
EMV  Lead Time
Sys Safety
CCA   Lead Time
WSESRB Lead Time
WSESRB Lead Time
SAASM Design Req's for HAE   Lead Time
HERO  Test Report
Freq Assignments





















































































































































































RADHAZ Analysis  Lead Time
EMC Lead Time
EMI  Lead Time
Env Qual
ESD  Lead Time






IFC  Lead Time
IA   Lead Time
JITC
SAASM HAE   Lead Time
Wait until all certs are done.
Equip Spectrum Cert Lead Time
Battery Approval Lead Time









































































































































































































Active Electronic Warfare (EW) Run 1 





Elapsed Time in Weeks
38318.92











Activity Statistics In Weeks (Hours)
HERO  Testing Lead Time
EMV  Lead Time
IA   Lead Time
JITC
Sys Safety
CCA   Lead Time
WSESRB Lead Time
WSESRB Lead Time







Range Safety Lead Time
HERO  Testing
EMV (Inter-Sys EMC)




















































































































































RADHAZ Analysis  Lead Time
EMC Lead Time
EMI  Lead Time
Env Qual
ESD  Lead Time






Freq Assignments   Lead Time
IFC  Lead Time





































































































































































































Active Electronic Warfare (EW) Run 2 









Elapsed Time in Weeks
25417.91











Activity Statistics In Weeks (Hours)
EMV  Lead Time
Sys Safety




Range Safety Lead Time
EMV (Inter-Sys EMC)
IA (Interim)
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IFC  Lead Time
IA   Lead Time
PMA
Start
Wait until all certs are done.









































































































Active Electronic Warfare (EW) Run 2 





Elapsed Time in Weeks
25746.41











Activity Statistics In Weeks (Hours)
EMV  Lead Time
IA   Lead Time
Sys Safety






Range Safety Lead Time
EMV (Inter-Sys EMC)




























































































RADHAZ Analysis  Lead Time
EMC Lead Time




IFC  Lead Time
Freq Assignments   Lead Time
Develop & Build
End



























































































































Active Electronic Warfare (EW) Run 3 
Intermediate Risk Timeline Reduction (IRTR) 






Elapsed Time in Weeks
12396.22











Activity Statistics In Weeks (Hours)
Sys Safety
CCA   Lead Time
Freq Assignments
Intrum Equip Spectrum Certt
Range Safety











































    
   





IFC  Lead Time
IA   Lead Time
Equip Spectrum Cert Lead Time
Freq Assignments   Lead Time
PMA
Start
Wait until all certs are done.

















































































Active Electronic Warfare (EW) Run 3 










Elapsed Time in Weeks
15096.99











Activity Statistics In Weeks (Hours)
IA   Lead Time
Sys Safety
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IFC  Lead Time
Freq Assignments   Lead Time
PMA
Start
Wait until all certs are done.





































































RAIN Cost Simulations 
 
Cost of Doing All Certifications 
Cost Matrices 1–3 
LASER Designator Runs 1 though 3 
• Baseline (BL) 
• Intermediate Risk Timeline Reduction (IRTR) 
• Low Risk Timeline Reduction (LRTR) 
 
Passive EW Runs 1 though 3 
• Baseline (BL) 
• Intermediate Risk Timeline Reduction (IRTR) 
• Low Risk Timeline Reduction (LRTR) 
 
Active EW Runs 1 though 3 
• Baseline (BL) 
• Intermediate Risk Timeline Reduction (IRTR) 








1 of 3 Cost Run Matrices 
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APPENDIX G. RISK ASSESSMENT 




Impact = Max number of weeks that the simulation predicts the schedule to exceed 78 
weeks. 
Likelihood = % chance of exceeding 78 weeks. 
 
Cost Risk 
Impact = Max predicted cost minus the mean cost.   
Likelihood = Chance of cost exceeding the mean cost. 
 
Performance Risk 
Impact = From the timeline reduction scenario document for the week of June 27th 2013 
and discussions with PMA-263 representatives. 








CDL No Change 0 
IFC 1,3,2 1,3,2 
Battery 1,4,2 0 
IA 1,4,2 No Change 
Spectrum 4,8,6  4,8,6 4,8,6 
T&E  OT in fielding Joint  DT OT 
JTIC 0 No Change 
SAASM No Change 0 





Laser Designator Payload Run 1 Chart size = 2.3”H x 3.7”W 
Baseline LD R1 Schedule Risk 
Impact  
= 126 Wks – 78 Wks 
= 48 Wks 
 
From Baseline Run 1 Simulation 
 





There is a 80.80% chance that the 
schedule will exceed 78 weeks by as 
much as 48 weeks. 
 
Baseline LD R1 Cost Risk Impact 
= Max – Mean 




Baseline LD R1 Cost Risk 
Likelihood 
= Right tail chance of exceeding the 
mean = 47.58% 
 
There is a 47.58% chance that the 




Baseline LD R1 Increased 
Performance Risk Impact 
N/A 
Baseline LD R1 Increased 
Performance Risk Likelihood 
 
N/A 
Laser Designator Payload Run 2  
Baseline LD R2 Schedule Risk 
Impact  
= 126 Wks – 78 Wks 





Baseline LD R2 Schedule Risk 
Likelihood 
= 775510 ppm = 77.55% 
 
 
There is a 77.55% chance that the 
schedule will exceed 78 weeks by as 




Baseline LD R2 Cost Risk Impact 
= Max – Mean 
= $2,156K – $1,265K = $891K 
 
Baseline LD R2 Cost Risk 
Likelihood 
= Right tail chance of exceeding the 
mean = 47.34% 
 
There is a 47.34% chance that the 
cost will exceed the mean by $891K. 
 
Baseline LD R2 Increased 
Performance Risk Impact 
N/A 
Baseline LD R2 Increased 
Performance Risk Likelihood 
N/A 
Laser Designator Payload Run 3  
Baseline LD R3 Schedule Risk 
Impact  











There is a 0.000009% chance that the 
schedule will exceed 78 weeks. 
 
Baseline LD R3 Cost Risk Impact 
= Max – Mean 
= $1058K – $520K = $538K 
 
 
Baseline LD R3 Cost Risk 
Likelihood 
= Right tail chance of exceeding the 
mean = 45.44% 
 
There is a 45.44% chance that the 
cost will exceed the mean by $538K.  
Baseline LD R3 Increased 
Performance Risk Impact 
N/A 
Baseline LD R3 Increased 
Performance Risk Likelihood 
 
N/A 
IRTR Laser Designator Run 1  
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IRTR LD R1 Schedule Risk Impact  
= 85 Wks – 78 Wks 









There is a 1.22% chance that the 
schedule will exceed 78 weeks by as 
much of 7 weeks. 
 
IRTR LD R1 Cost Risk Impact 
= Max – Mean 
= $1332K – $856K = $476K 
 
IRTR LD R1 Cost Risk Likelihood 
= Right tail chance of exceeding the 
mean = 44.54% 
 
 
There is a 44.54% chance that the 
cost will exceed the mean by $476K. 
 
IRTR LD R1 Increased Performance 
Risk Impact 
TBD 





IRTR Laser Designator Run 2  
IRTR LD R2 Schedule Risk Impact  
= 85 Wks – 78 Wks 









There is a 1.22% chance that the 
schedule will exceed 78 weeks by as 
much of 7 weeks. 
 
IRTR LD R2 Cost Risk Impact 
= Max – Mean 
= $509K – $437K = $72K 
 
IRTR LD R2 Cost Risk Likelihood 
= Right tail chance of exceeding the 
mean = 49.07% 
 
 
There is a 49.07% chance that the 




IRTR LD R2 Increased Performance 
Risk Impact 
TBD 




IRTR Laser Designator Run 3  
IRTR LD R3 Schedule Risk Impact  
= 41 Wks – 78 Wks 









There is a 0% chance that the 




IRTR LD R3 Cost Risk Impact 
= Max – Mean 
= $97K – $55K = $42K 
 
IRTR LD R3 Cost Risk Likelihood 
= Right tail chance of exceeding the 
mean = 49.44% 
 
 
There is a 49.44% chance that the 
cost will exceed the mean by $42K. 
 
IRTR LD R3 Increased Performance 
Risk Impact 
TBD 




LRTR Laser Designator Run 1  
LRTR LD R1 Schedule Risk Impact  
= 85 Wks – 78 Wks 











There is a 0.84% chance that the 
schedule will exceed 78 weeks by as 
much of 7 weeks. 
 
LRTR LD R1 Cost Risk Impact 
= Max – Mean 
= $1,694K – $1,041K = $653K 
 
LRTR LD R1 Cost Risk Likelihood 
= Right tail chance of exceeding the 
mean = 46.57% 
 
 
There is a 46.57% chance that the 
cost will exceed the mean by $653K. 
 
LRTR LD R1 Increased Performance 
Risk Impact 
TBD 




LRTR Laser Designator Run 2  
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LRTR LD R2 Schedule Risk Impact  
= 85 Wks – 78 Wks 









There is a 0.99% chance that the 
schedule will exceed 78 weeks by as 
much of 7 weeks. 
 
LRTR LD R2 Cost Risk Impact 
= Max – Mean 
= $1687K – $1,035K = $652K 
 
LRTR LD R2 Cost Risk Likelihood 
= Right tail chance of exceeding the 
mean = 46.60% 
 
 
There is a 46.60% chance that the 
cost will exceed the mean by $652K. 
 
LRTR LD R2 Increased Performance 
Risk Impact 
TBD 





LRTR Laser Designator Run 3  
LRTR LD R3 Schedule Risk Impact  
= 54 Wks – 78 Wks 









There is a 0% chance that the 
schedule will exceed 78 weeks by as 
much of 48 weeks. 
 
LRTR LD R3 Cost Risk Impact 
= Max – Mean 
= $568K – $287K = $281K 
 
LRTR LD R3 Cost Risk Likelihood 
= Right tail chance of exceeding the 
mean = 45.51% 
 
 
There is a 45.51% chance that the 




LRTR LD R3 Increased Performance 
Risk Impact 
TBD 




Passive EW Run 1  
Baseline Passive EW R1 Schedule 
Risk Impact  
= 241 Wks – 78 Wks = 163 Wks 
 
 
Baseline Passive EW R1 Schedule 
Risk Likelihood 
= 1000000.00 PPM = 100% 
 
 
There is a 100% chance that the 




Baseline Passive EW R1 Cost Risk 
Impact 
= Max – Mean 
= $2,617K – $1,723K = $894K 
 
 
Baseline Passive EW R1 Cost Risk 
Likelihood 
= Right tail chance of exceeding the 
mean = 47.74% 
 
There is a 47.74% chance that the 
cost will exceed the mean by $894K. 
 
Baseline Passive EW R1 Increased 
Performance Risk Impact 
N/A 
Baseline Passive EW R1 Increased 
Performance Risk Likelihood 
 
N/A 
Passive EW Run 2  
Baseline Passive EW R2 Schedule 
Risk Impact  











There is a 77.27% chance that the 
schedule will exceed 78 weeks. 
 
Baseline Passive EW R2 Cost Risk 
Impact 
= Max – Mean 
= $2,124K – $1,231K = $893K 
 
 
Baseline Passive EW R2 Cost Risk 
Likelihood 
= Right tail chance of exceeding the 
mean = 47.72% 
 
There is a 47.72% chance that the 
cost will exceed the mean by $893K. 
 
Baseline Passive EW R2 Increased 
Performance Risk Impact 
N/A 
Baseline Passive EW R2 Increased 
Performance Risk Likelihood 
 
N/A 
Passive EW Run 3  
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Baseline Passive EW R3 Schedule 
Risk Impact  









There is a 0% chance that the 
schedule will exceed 78 weeks. 
 
Baseline Passive EW R3 Cost Risk 
Impact 
= Max – Mean 
= $1058K – $520K = $538K 
 
 
Baseline Passive EW R3 Cost Risk 
Likelihood 
= Right tail chance of exceeding the 
mean = 45.44% 
 
There is a 45.44% chance that the 
cost will exceed the mean by $538K. 
 
Baseline Passive EW R3 Increased 




Baseline Passive EW R3 Increased 
Performance Risk Likelihood 
 
N/A 
IRTR Passive EW Run 1  
IRTR PEW R1 Schedule Risk 
Impact  
= 126 Wks – 78 Wks 










There is a 87.16% chance that the 
schedule will exceed 78 weeks by as 




IRTR PEW R1 Cost Risk Impact 
= Max – Mean 
= $1,689K – $1,230K = $459K 
 
IRTR PEW R1 Cost Risk Likelihood 
= Right tail chance of exceeding the 
mean = 45.10% 
 
 
There is a 45.10% chance that the 
cost will exceed the mean by $459K. 
 
IRTR PEW R1 Increased 
Performance Risk Impact 
TBD 
IRTR PEW R1 Increased 
Performance Risk Likelihood 
TBD 
IRTR Passive EW Run 2  
IRTR PEW R2 Schedule Risk 
Impact  
= 85 Wks – 78 Wks 











There is a 1.26% chance that the 
schedule will exceed 78 weeks by as 
much of 48 weeks. 
 
IRTR PEW R2 Cost Risk Impact 
= Max – Mean 
= $1,239K – $784K = $455K 
 
IRTR PEW R2 Cost Risk Likelihood 
= Right tail chance of exceeding the 
mean = 45.18% 
 
 
There is a 45.18% chance that the 
cost will exceed the mean by $455K. 
 
IRTR PEW R2 Increased 
Performance Risk Impact 
TBD 
IRTR PEW R2 Increased 
Performance Risk Likelihood 
 
TBD 
IRTR Passive EW Run 3  
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IRTR PEW R3 Schedule Risk 
Impact  
= 27 Wks – 78 Wks 









There is a 0% chance that the 
schedule will exceed 78 weeks by as 
much of 48 weeks. 
 
IRTR PEW R3 Cost Risk Impact 
= Max – Mean 
= $97K – $55K = $42K 
 
IRTR PEW R3 Cost Risk Likelihood 
= Right tail chance of exceeding the 
mean = 49.44% 
 
 
There is a 49.44% chance that the 
cost will exceed the mean by $42K. 
 
IRTR PEW R3 Increased 
Performance Risk Impact 
TBD 
IRTR PEW R3 Increased TBD 
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Performance Risk Likelihood 
 
LRTR Passive EW Run 1  
LRTR PEW R1 Schedule Risk 
Impact  
= 119 Wks – 78 Wks 










There is a 45.94% chance that the 
schedule will exceed 78 weeks by as 




LRTR PEW R1 Cost Risk Impact 
= Max – Mean 
= $2,040K – $1,385K = $655K 
 
LRTR PEW R1 Cost Risk 
Likelihood 
= Right tail chance of exceeding the 
mean = 46.69% 
 
 
There is a 46.69% chance that the 
cost will exceed the mean by $655K.  
LRTR PEW R1 Increased 
Performance Risk Impact 
TBD 
LRTR PEW R1 Increased 
Performance Risk Likelihood 
TBD 
LRTR Passive EW Run 2  
LRTR PEW R2 Schedule Risk 
Impact  
= 85 Wks – 78 Wks 











There is a 1.01% chance that the 
schedule will exceed 78 weeks by as 
much of 7 weeks. 
 
LRTR PEW R2 Cost Risk Impact 
= Max – Mean 
= $1,674K – $1,020K = $654K 
 
LRTR PEW R2 Cost Risk 
Likelihood 
= Right tail chance of exceeding the 
mean = 46.59% 
 
 
There is a 46.59% chance that the 
cost will exceed the mean by $654K.  
LRTR PEW R2 Increased 
Performance Risk Impact 
TBD 
LRTR PEW R2 Increased 
Performance Risk Likelihood 
 
TBD 
LRTR Passive EW Run 3  
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LRTR PEW R3 Schedule Risk 
Impact  
= 54 Wks – 78 Wks 









There is a 0% chance that the 
schedule will exceed 78 weeks. 
 
LRTR PEW R3 Cost Risk Impact 
= Max – Mean 
= $568K – $287K = $281K 
 
LRTR PEW R3 Cost Risk 
Likelihood 
= Right tail chance of exceeding the 
mean = 45.51% 
 
 
There is a 45.51% chance that the 
cost will exceed the mean by $281K.  
LRTR PEW R3 Increased 
Performance Risk Impact 
TBD 
LRTR PEW R3 Increased TBD 
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Performance Risk Likelihood 
  
Active EW Run 1  
Baseline Active EW R1 Schedule 
Risk Impact  




Baseline Active EW R1 Schedule 
Risk Likelihood 
= 1000000.00 PPM = 100% 
 
 
There is a 100% chance that the 
schedule will exceed 78 weeks. 
 
Baseline Active EW R1 Cost Risk 
Impact 
= Max – Mean 
= $2,617K – $1,723K = $894K 
 
 
Baseline Active EW R1 Cost Risk 
Likelihood 
= Right tail chance of exceeding the 
mean = 47.74% 
 
There is a 47.74% chance that the  
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cost will exceed the mean by $894K. 
Baseline Active EW R1 Increased 
Performance Risk Impact 
N/A 
Baseline Active EW R1 Increased 
Performance Risk Likelihood 
 
N/A 
Active EW Run 2  
Baseline Active EW R2 Schedule 
Risk Impact  




Baseline Active EW R2 Schedule 
Risk Likelihood 
= 999999.98 PPM = 99.99% 
 
 
There is a 99.99% chance that the 




Baseline Active EW R2 Cost Risk 
Impact 
= Max – Mean 
= $2,183K – $1,285K = $898K 
 
 
Baseline Active EW R2 Cost Risk 
Likelihood 
 
= Right tail chance of exceeding the 
mean = 47.51% 
 
There is a 47.51% chance that the 
cost will exceed the mean by $898K. 
 
Baseline Active EW R2 Increased 
Performance Risk Impact 
N/A 
Baseline Active EW R2 Increased 
Performance Risk Likelihood 
 
N/A 
Active EW Run 3  
Baseline Active EW R3 Schedule 
Risk Impact  






Baseline Active EW R3 Schedule 
Risk Likelihood 
= 994685.85 PPM = 99.47% 
 
 
There is a 99.47% chance that the 
schedule will exceed 78 weeks. 
 
Baseline Active EW R3 Cost Risk 
Impact 
= Max – Mean 
= $1069K – $530K = $539K 
 
 
Baseline Active EW R3 Cost Risk 
Likelihood 
= Right tail chance of exceeding the 
mean = 45.47% 
 
There is a 45.47% chance that the 
cost will exceed the mean by $539K. 
 
Baseline Active EW R3 Increased 
Performance Risk Impact 
N/A 
Baseline Active EW R3 Increased 
Performance Risk Likelihood 
N/A 
  
IRTR Active EW Run 1  
IRTR AEW R1 Schedule Risk Impact  
= 124 Wks – 78 Wks 












There is a 84.44% chance that the 
schedule will exceed 78 weeks by as 
much of 46 weeks. 
 
 
IRTR AEW R1 Cost Risk Impact 
= Max – Mean 
= $1,689K – $1,230K = $459K 
 
IRTR AEW R1 Cost Risk Likelihood 
= Right tail chance of exceeding the 
mean = 45.10% 
 
 
There is a 45.10% chance that the cost 
will exceed the mean by $459K. 
 
 





IRTR AEW R1 Increased Performance Risk 
Likelihood 
TBD 
IRTR Active EW Run 2  
IRTR AEW R2 Schedule Risk 
Impact  
= 85 Wks – 78 Wks 





IRTR AEW R2 Schedule Risk 
Likelihood 
 = 1.11% 
 
 
There is a 1.11% chance that the 
schedule will exceed 78 weeks by as 
much of 7 weeks. 
 
 
IRTR AEW R2 Cost Risk Impact 
= Max – Mean 
= $1297K – $815K = $482K 
 
IRTR AEW R2 Cost Risk Likelihood 
= Right tail chance of exceeding the 
mean = 44.36% 
 
 
There is a 44.36% chance that the 





IRTR AEW R2 Increased 
Performance Risk Impact 
TBD 
IRTR AEW R2 Increased 
Performance Risk Likelihood 
TBD 
IRTR Active EW Run 3  
IRTR AEW R3 Schedule Risk 
Impact  
= 41 Wks – 78 Wks 










There is a 0% chance that the 





IRTR AEW R3 Cost Risk Impact 
= Max – Mean 
= $100K – $60K = $40K 
 
IRTR AEW R3 Cost Risk Likelihood 
= Right tail chance of exceeding the 
mean = 49.40% 
 
 
There is a 49.40% chance that the 
cost will exceed the mean by $40K. 
 
 
IRTR AEW R3 Increased 
Performance Risk Impact 
TBD 
IRTR AEW R3 Increased 
Performance Risk Likelihood 
TBD 
  
LRTR Active EW Run 1  
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LRTR AEW R1 Schedule Risk 
Impact  
= 119 Wks – 78 Wks 









There is a 45.94% chance that the 
schedule will exceed 78 weeks by as 
much of 41 weeks. 
 
LRTR AEW R1 Cost Risk Impact 
= Max – Mean 
= $2,063K – $1,411K = $652K 
 
LRTR AEW R1 Cost Risk 
Likelihood 
= Right tail chance of exceeding the 
mean = 46.71% 
 
 
There is a 46.71% chance that the 
cost will exceed the mean by $652K.  
LRTR AEW R1 Increased 
Performance Risk Impact 
TBD 
LRTR AEW R1 Increased TBD 
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Performance Risk Likelihood 
LRTR Active EW Run 2  
LRTR AEW R2 Schedule Risk 
Impact  
= 85 Wks – 78 Wks 









There is a 1.01% chance that the 
schedule will exceed 78 weeks by as 
much of 7 weeks. 
 
LRTR AEW R2 Cost Risk Impact 
= Max – Mean 
= $1,698K – $1,045K = $653K 
 
LRTR AEW R2 Cost Risk 
Likelihood 
= Right tail chance of exceeding the 
mean = 46.61% 
 
 
There is a 46.61% chance that the 
cost will exceed the mean by $653K.  
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LRTR AEW R2 Increased 
Performance Risk Impact 
TBD 
LRTR AEW R2 Increased 
Performance Risk Likelihood 
TBD 
LRTR Active EW Run 3  
LRTR AEW R3 Schedule Risk 
Impact  
= 54 Wks – 78 Wks 









There is a 0% chance that the 




LRTR AEW R3 Cost Risk Impact 
= Max – Mean 
= $570K – $290K = $280K 
 
LRTR AEW R3 Cost Risk 
Likelihood 
= Right tail chance of exceeding the 
mean = 45.50% 
 
 
There is a 45.50% chance that the 
cost will exceed the mean by $280K.  
LRTR AEW R3 Increased 
Performance Risk Impact 
TBD 
LRTR AEW R3 Increased 







Laser Designator Payload 
 
Baseline (BL) 
 R1 Simple R2 Complex R3 Mature 
Schedule Risk Impact 48 Wks 48Wks 0 Wks (-13Wks) 
Schedule Risk Likelihood 80.80% 77.55% 0.000009% 
Cost Risk Impact $889K $891K $538K 
Cost Risk Likelihood 47.58% 47.34% 45.44% 
Performance Risk Impact N/A N/A N/A 
Performance Risk Likelihood N/A N/A N/A 
 
 
Intermediate Risk Timeline Reduction (IRTR) 
 R1 Simple R2 Complex R3 Mature 
Schedule Risk Impact 7 Wks 7 Wks 0 Wks (-37Wks) 
Schedule Risk Likelihood 1.22% 1.22% 0% 
Cost Risk Impact $476K $72K $42K 
Cost Risk Likelihood 44.54% 49.07% 49.44% 
Performance Risk Impact TBD TBD TBD 
Performance Risk Likelihood TBD TBD TBD 
 
 
Low Risk Timeline Reduction (LRTR) 
 R1 Simple R2 Complex R3 Mature 
Schedule Risk Impact 7 Wks 7 Wks 0 Wks (-24Wks) 
Schedule Risk Likelihood 0.84% 0.99% 0% 
Cost Risk Impact $653K $652K $281K 
Cost Risk Likelihood 46.57% 46.60% 45.51% 
Performance Risk Impact TBD TBD TBD 





Passive Electronic Warfare Payload 
 
Baseline (BL) 
 R1 Simple R2 Complex R3 Mature 
Schedule Risk Impact 163 Wks 48 Wks 0 Wks (-24 Wks) 
Schedule Risk Likelihood 100% 77.27% 0% 
Cost Risk Impact $894K $893K $538K 
Cost Risk Likelihood 47.74% 47.72% 45.44% 
Performance Risk Impact N/A N/A N/A 
Performance Risk Likelihood N/A N/A N/A 
 
 
Intermediate Risk Timeline Reduction (IRTR) 
 R1 Simple R2 Complex R3 Mature 
Schedule Risk Impact 48 Wks 7 Wks -51 Wks 
Schedule Risk Likelihood 87.16% 1.26% 0% 
Cost Risk Impact $459K $455K $42k 
Cost Risk Likelihood 45.10% 45.18% 49.44% 
Performance Risk Impact TBD TBD TBD 
Performance Risk Likelihood TBD TBD TBD 
 
 
Low Risk Timeline Reduction (LRTR) 
 R1 Simple R2 Complex R3 Mature 
Schedule Risk Impact 41 Wks 7 Wks 0 Wks (-24 Wks) 
Schedule Risk Likelihood 45.94% 1.01% 0% 
Cost Risk Impact $655K $654K $281K 
Cost Risk Likelihood 46.69% 46.59% 45.51% 
Performance Risk Impact TBD TBD TBD 





Active Electronic Warfare Payload (Also Data Com and RADAR) 
Baseline (BL) 
 R1 Simple R2 Complex R3 Mature 
Schedule Risk Impact 163 Wks 85 Wks 55 Wks 
Schedule Risk Likelihood 100% 99.99% 99.47% 
Cost Risk Impact $894K $898K $539K 
Cost Risk Likelihood 47.74% 47.51% 45.47% 
Performance Risk Impact N/A N/A N/A 
Performance Risk Likelihood N/A N/A N/A 
 
 
Intermediate Risk Timeline Reduction (IRTR) 
 R1 Simple R2 Complex R3 Mature 
Schedule Risk Impact 46 Wks 7 Wks 0 Wks (-37 Wks) 
Schedule Risk Likelihood 84.44% 1.11% 0% 
Cost Risk Impact $459K $482K $40K 
Cost Risk Likelihood 45.10% 44.36% 49.40% 
Performance Risk Impact TBD TBD TBD 
Performance Risk Likelihood TBD TBD TBD 
 
 
Low Risk Timeline Reduction (LRTR) 
 R1 Simple R2 Complex R3 Mature 
Schedule Risk Impact 41 Wks 7 Wks 0 Wks (-24 Wks) 
Schedule Risk Likelihood 45.94% 1.01% 0% 
Cost Risk Impact $652K $653K $280K 
Cost Risk Likelihood 46.71% 46.61% 45.50% 
Performance Risk Impact TBD TBD TBD 






 Performance Risk Matrices 
 
(Refer to Tables; Table 5:  Risk Likelihood Definitions and Table 6:  Risk 
Impact Definitions for Performance and Schedule for Impact Risk and Risk Probability 
ratings scale.)  
































APPENDIX H. RAPID PAYLOAD INTEGRATION CHECKLIST 
 
Section 1: The Rapid Payload Integration Checklist is a product of the RAIN Team 
Research and is a deliverable item to PMA-265 for future integration projects. 
 
Section 2: Component Analyses and Attribute Investigation: Certification Justification of 
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Figure 37:   Safety Certifications  
Airworthiness Certification 
Statutory/Regulatory Airworthiness Requirement 
Airspace, regardless of sovereignty or elevation, will always be expected to be 
shared among a variety of aircraft (public, civil, and private). Because of this, steps must 
be taken to ensure the safe operation of aircraft that navigate through the same airspace 
and to protect property/personnel on the ground. This is imposed through a statutory 




NAVAIR Airworthiness Certification Process 
  For aircraft (manned and unmanned) that is owned/ and/or operated by or for the 
U.S. Navy, this is satisfied by an accomplished through a NAVAIR airworthiness 
certification called a Flight Clearance per NAVAIRINST 13034.1D. This document is 
designed to ensure that operation of the specifically-configured system can be performed 
within acceptable standards of loss of life and/or damage to property or the environment. 
It is developed by the PMA, in coordination with the applicable SMEs and NAVAIR’s 
Airworthiness Office (Air 4.0P).   
RAIN is concerned with payloads affected by rapidly-changing UAS 
technologies. This requires an airworthiness certification process that is flexible and can 
quickly incorporate new capabilities. A NAVAIR interim flight clearance (IFC) is well-
suited to this requirement because it can be generated in as little as a few weeks or up to 
20 weeks, depending on complexity of the system. There is no cost for this certification 
since the labor hours are already included in the PMA budget. It is developed by the 
platform’s Assistant Program Manager for Systems Engineering (APMSE), in 
coordination with the applicable SMEs, and approved for release by NAVAIR’s 
Airworthiness Office (Air 4.0P).   
Airworthiness Waivers/Interim Approval Request 
No waivers are authorized for airworthiness certifications; but IFCs can be 
released to obtain additional data in support of relaxing previous operating limitations 
and restrictions.  
Battery Certification 
Statutory/Regulatory Battery Requirement 
Lithium (Li)-ion batteries are utilized in a variety of equipment throughout the 
U.S. Navy due to their ability to provide high voltage and long life. Unfortunately, these 
inherent attractive characteristics also make these batteries highly susceptible to 
overheating, which could cause ruptures and explosions. This has resulted in the 
establishment of the Navy’s Lithium Battery Safety Program, as per NAVSEAINST 
9310.1B, to mitigate the dangers associated with the utilization of these particular power 
sources.   
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NAVAIR Battery Certification Process 
Through this program, any Li-ion battery that will be employed in any U.S. Navy 
equipment must be certified by NOSSA prior to initial fielding. This certification process 
will be conducted by the PMA, in coordination with NAVAIR’s Propulsion and Power 
competency (AIR 4.4.5.2). If no testing is required, a battery can be certified for 
installation into a specific platform within a couple of weeks and at a cost of $3K for 
documentation expenses. A lack of OEM data will require complex testing, thus 
increasing the certification process duration to 26 weeks and costing the PMA $80K. 
Battery Waivers/Interim Approval Request 
No waivers are authorized for a battery certification; but interim approvals may be 
granted for limited duration. For these interim approval requests, documentation (e.g., 
Universal Need Statement (UNS)) must be provided that justifies the need to operate with 
uncertified batteries before NOSSA completes their analysis. 
Laser Certification 
Statutory/Regulatory Laser Requirement 
The Department of Navy uses a variety of LASERs to complete its mission. The 
use of LASERs are regulated under Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Parts 
1040, 1040.10, and 1040.11. These regulations dictate both how LASERs can be built 
and used, and are focused at the civilian sectors. For the military to effectively use its 
LASERs, the CFR Regulations are further decomposed and refined by DoD Instruction 
6055.15, which is further decomposed by OPNAVINST 5100.27B. Since DoD LASER 
employments are significantly different from, and potentially more dangerous than, the 
civilian sector, the DoN has established the Navy Laser Hazards Control Program. 
NAVAIR Laser Certification Process 
There are three (3) basic parts to the Navy LASER certification process. The 
process is controlled by the LASER Safety Review Board (LSRB), which holds final 
certification authority within the Navy and USMC. The first phase of an LSRB approval 
is to issue a Military Exemption Letter to the manufacturer for the specific laser being 
procured. Once this letter is obtained a LASER radiation hazard evaluation must be 
completed in accordance with the LASER Characterization Test Report (ANSI Z136.4, 
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Recommended Practice for Laser Safety Measurements for Hazard Evaluation), this test 
is usually conducted by a DoD lab, with a cost ranging from $10K to $20K. Including 
lead times, the characterization should take between four (4) and 10 weeks. Upon 
successful completion of the LASER characterization a Design Checklist 5100.27B for 
the LASER system should be completed, based on the characterization of the LASER, a 
system safety measure, and the user mission. Although the LSRB meets once a month, 
requests to present LASERs for certification must be submitted two (2) months in 
advance. The LSRB review and subsequent approval letter can be completed in two (2) to 
four (4) weeks. 
Laser Waivers/Interim Approval Request 
LSRB waivers are not authorized, but interim approvals can be obtained during 
system development. These interim approvals follow the standard certification process, 
but are designed to allow incremental increases in LASER use to support testing and 
safely develop the system.   
Weapon Certification (Weapons System Explosives Safety Review Board-WESRB) 
Statutory/Regulatory Weapon Requirement 
The WSESRB was created via regulation in 1968 in response to explosives related 
mishaps aboard aircraft carriers. Because safety is not common sense, the WSESRB 
provides independent oversight to ensure maximum compliance with system explosives 
safety requirements. The WSESRB responsibilities, authorities, and operation procedures 
are issued by NAVSEAINST 8020.6D and apply to all Navy systems. The WSESRB 
authority chain is as follows: 
DoDI5000.2 Para E7.7 
• PM shall identify, evaluate and manage safety and health hazards. 
• Explains the process for accepting risk 
SECNAVINST 5000.2C 




• Directs Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)/Commandant of the Marine Corps 
(CMC) to establish safety programs. 
OPNAVINST 8020.14 / Marine Corps Order (MCO) P8020.11 
• Explosives Safety Policy 
• Tasks COMNAVSEASYSCOM to establish WSESRB 
NAVSEAINST 8020.6D 
• Defines WSESRB process and procedures 
NAVAIR Weapon Certification Process 
The range of issues of concern related to explosives include:  Hazard 
Classification, Insensitive Munitions, Final (Type) Qualification of Energetics, Lithium 
Battery Certification, and Human Systems Integration. The WSESRB reviews system 
designs, provides concurrence or non-concurrence with system design, recommends 
design changes, concurs or non-concurs with PM risk assessments. Each program has a 
WSESRB POC who is to facilitate interactions between the program and the WSESRB. 
The WSESRB POC follows the procedures detailed in NAVSEAINST 8020.6D to 
request a review of a system by the board. A board representative informs the POC when 
the board can review the system.   
A program representative and the WSESRB POC attend a meeting of the 
WSESRB to brief the system. The board confers and issues its findings. If the board finds 
that there is residual risk it may not concur with the design and recommend design 
changes. Residual risk may be accepted by the program; but any residual risk assessments 
must be concurred with by the WSESRB and accepted at the appropriate level:  High 
Risk = Assistant Secretary of the Navy (ASN) Research Development and Acquisition 
(RDA), Serious Risk = PEO, Moderate/Low Risk = PM. Usually multiple reviews are 
required.   
Weapon Waivers/Interim Approval Request 
The recommendations of the WSESRB can be waived by having the associated 
residual risk accepted at the appropriate level. The assessment of residual risk must be 
 396 
 
concurred with by the WSESRB. The appropriate level for accepting residual risk is as 
follows:   High Risk = ASN (RDA), Serious Risk = PEO, Moderate/Low Risk = PM. 
There are no interim approvals. 
System Safety Certification 
Statutory/Regulatory System Safety Requirement 
Imposed under statutory requirement, the system safety standard practice MIL-
STD-882 ascertains DoD’s methodology for identifying and assessing Environmental, 
Safety, and Occupational Health (ESOH) hazards as well as mitigating ESOH risks 
confronted during integration, testing, fielding, operation, and disposal of defense 
systems if applied. The approach shall be compliant with DoDI 5000.02. 
NAVAIR System Safety Certification Process 
With commitment to ensure safety of defense systems, public property, and 
organizational resources from accidental destruction, damage, or environmental impacts 
and to protect private and public personnel from accidental loss, injury, or occupational 
illness, a system safety approval is essential in managing and minimizing ESOH risks 
related to DoD systems. The System Safety Risk Assessment (SSRA) process should be 
applied appropriately based on the ESOH disciplines to identify hazards and mitigate 
associated risks throughout the SE process for any defense system, including integrating 
and fielding even tested modular payloads with new or existing technology development.  
The system safety risk assessment process consists of, but not limited to, 
establishing an ESOH hazard analysis, operator’s and maintainer’s manuals with 
appropriate cautions and warnings, system safety engineering plan, hazardous materials 
management plan (HMMP), Programmatic Environmental, Safety, and Health Evaluation 
(PESCHE), system-of-system integration and interoperability hazard analysis, Failure 
Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) or other reliability data, and any fault 
tree analysis. It will also include, if applicable, Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to 
Personnel (HERP) and Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Fuel (HERF) 
calculations, NOSSA approval of lithium batteries and Material Safety Data Sheet 
(MSDS), and all other system safety related documents. In order to obtain an approval for 
system safety, a System Safety Risk Assessment (SSRA) should be processed and 
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approved by PMA within one (1) to 26 weeks, with a cost ranging from $3k to $50k, 
depending on the complexity of the system. 
System Safety Waivers/Interim Approval Request 
No interim approval and waivers are authorized for system safety certification. 
According to MIL-STD-882, “ESOH hazards shall be identified and assessed, and ESOH 
risks shall be mitigated and accepted in accordance with DoD policy.” {{36 United States 
Department of Defense 2000}}. 
Range Safety Certification 
Statutory/Regulatory Range Safety Requirement 
According to NAVAIR Instruction 3700.3 paragraph 4a, “DoDD 3200.11 
establishes the policy for operations and administration of DoD test and evaluation 
(T&E) facilities designated as Major Range and Test Facility Bases (MRTFB) and 
designates the Range Commander as responsible for safety on each MRTFB range.” {{77 
United States Navy 2007}}. Paragraph 4b of the same instruction states the requirement 
that “the NAVAIR Range Department, consisting of three (3) MRTFB range sites, 
requires a unified approach for range safety” {{77 United States Navy 2007}}. For 
purposes of consistency and the effectiveness of range safety programs at each site, all 
sites shall implement common policies. Any deviation from policies will be limited to 
those necessitated by site-unique missions, capabilities or constraints.”  Further details on 
range safety are found in Naval Air Warfare Aircraft Division (NAWCAD) Instruction 
3710.1A. 
NAVAIR Range Safety Certification Process 
Range Safety is concerned with many of the same issues as the System Safety 
community, but specifically in the context of operating the system in and T&E range 
environment. The test range environment has different system stressors and additional 
concerns that may not be present in the operational environment. These special 
requirements must be addressed to ensure safety of defense systems, public property, and 
organizational resources from accidental destruction, damage, or environmental impacts 
and to protect private and public personnel from accidental loss, injury, or occupational 
illness on or around a test range. Range Safety approval builds on the work done to 
 398 
 
obtain System Safety and IFC approvals. The NAVAIR range safety office (AIR-5.2.3) is 
responsible for the review and approval of range safety-related portions of test plans, 
determining project support requirements are in concert with established command 
policy, and providing day-to-day policy interpretation. Range Safety Officers (RSO) are 
tasked with ensuring that no unnecessary risk is accepted by the range. 
In order to aid in obtaining approval of a test plan from the RSO, it is crucial that 
it includes containment of all hazards, avoids single point failures, and categorizes all 
risks that the equipment may present to the range and its personnel along with its 
mitigating steps. Risks should be identified as early as possible during the process of 
writing the test plan. Standard operating procedures for handling such risks must be 
written and established. Training must be given to personnel who are operating the 
equipment on such risks, with any go/no-go criteria established prior to operation.  
The range safety risk assessment process consists of, but is not limited to, 
reviewing the hazardous materials management plan (HMMP); Programmatic 
Environmental, Safety, and Health Evaluation (PESCHE); system-of-system integration 
and interoperability hazard analysis; Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Integration 
Analysis Report (E3IAR) and associated verification reports; Hazards of Electromagnetic 
Radiation to Personnel (HERP) and Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Fuel 
(HERF) calculations; Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance (HERO) (on the 
system as well on other systems exposed to the system); the findings of the WSESRB; 
NOSSA approval of lithium batteries and Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS); and all 
other system safety related documents. Additional information that may be required 
includes, but is not limited to, hazard pattern analyses, system design descriptions, system 
operation descriptions, and test plans. Exact requirements will be based on the system 
design and operation descriptions, test plan, and discussions between the RSO, test 
engineers and PMA. Once the required information needs is submitted, a determination 
will usually be made within four (4) weeks, with cost dependent on the complexity of the 
system.  
Range Safety Waivers/Interim Approval Request 
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There are no formal range safety waivers. Similar to System Safety, hazards shall 
be identified and assessed, and ESOH risks mitigated and accepted in accordance with 
DoD policy. All risks to the range or people on or around the range must be approved by 
the RSO, who is the cognizant point of contact if any questions arise about any particular 
situations in regards to range issues related to risks. 
Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) Certification 
Statutory/Regulatory E3 Requirement 
Electromagnetic radiation permeates the environments of the modern battlefield 
and the modern test range. In order to ensure the safe and correct operation of military 
electronic systems, the DoD directs the services to address E3 concerns in DoDD 3222.3. 
The Navy implements that directive through SECNAVINST 2400.0, SECNAVINST 
5000.2, OPNAVINST 2400.20, and NAVAIRINST 2400.1. The procedures and 
standards to be used to comply with these regulations are MIL-STD-464, MIL-STD-461, 
MIL-HDBK-235, and NAVAIR 16–1–529. 
 E3 is concerned with the negative or unintended effects of the electromagnetic 
environment on both the system of interest and the systems with which it interacts. All 
electrical systems produce electromagnetic signals that can travel via both radiation and 
conduction, and potentially cause unintended unsafe malfunctions of the system of 
interest or other external systems. Because of this, system designs must adequately 
protect the system from the environment and protect external systems from its emissions. 
Both analysis and test are used to determine if the system has adequate protections to 
ensure safe operation in its intended environments. Up to thirteen analyses and 
certifications may be required that “encompasses the electromagnetic effects addressed 
by the disciplines of electromagnetic compatibility (EMC), electromagnetic interference 
(EMI), electromagnetic vulnerability (EMV), electromagnetic pulse (EMP), electronic 
protection (EP), electrostatic discharge (ESD), and hazards of electromagnetic radiation 
to personnel (HERP), ordnance (HERO), and volatile materials (HERF). E3 includes the 
electromagnetic effects generated by all electromagnetic environment (EME) contributors 
including radio frequency (RF) systems, ultra-wideband devices, high-power microwave 
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(HPM) systems, lightning, precipitation static, etc.” {{42 United States Air Force 
2010}}. 
NAVAIR E3 Certification Process 
The first step is the E3 Integration & Analysis Report (E3IAR), which details the 
tailoring of the requirements in MIL-STD-464C & MIL-STD-461F for the system of 
interest by providing a rationale to conduct testing or not for each requirement. 
Additionally, a Radiation Hazard (RADHAZ) analysis may be required. Depending on 
the findings from the E3IAR and RADHAZ analysis, the below compliance certifications 









• Bonding & Grounding 
• Lighting 
• Precipitation Static (P-Static) 
 “Within NAVAIR, Electromagnetic Environmental Effects/Spectrum 
Supportability (E3/SS) approval and enforcement is the responsibility of the 
Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Division, (AIR-4.1.13).” (NAVAIRINST 2400.1 
2009, p.3) 
E3 Waivers/Interim Approval Request 
Waivers may be granted for most of the E3 certifications by the CNO, except for 
HERO testing, which can be waived by NOSSA through the WSESRB. Interim 
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certifications do not apply, but systems that do not fully comply with certifications 
regarding radiated emissions may be subjected to minimum standoff distances from other 
systems, fuel, or people. 
SECURITY COMPONENTS 






































Figure 38:  Security Certifications 
Information Assurance (IA) Certification 
Statutory/Regulatory IA Requirement 
Information Assurance (IA) provides a secure, interoperable, net-centric 
Information Management (IM)/Information Technology (IT) environment across the 
Department of Navy (DoN) Enterprise. All DoN information and Information Systems 
(ISs) are serious to maintaining our naval control and national security. To ensure 
adequate protection for our information assets, DoD Information Assurance Certification 
and Accreditation (C&A) Process (DIACAP) evaluates the defense-in-depth layering of 
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IA principle and control to people, processes, and technology by following the DoDI 
8500.01E, DoDI 8500.2, and DoDI 8510.01 guidelines. 
NAVAIR Information Assurance (IA) Certification Process 
The SME from AIR 7.2.6 submits a DoD IA Certification (DIACAP) package to 
the Operational Designated Accrediting Authority (ODAA) for an Authorization to 
Operate (ATO). Although collection of the required data and performance of the 
vulnerability scans can be completed in 30 to 60 days, review of the DIACAP package by 
the ODAA can take up to 52 weeks. 
IA Waivers/Interim Approval Request 
No waivers are authorized for IA certification. An Interim Authority to Test 
(IATT) may be issued by the Designated Accrediting Authority (DAA) (NAVAIR Chief 
Information Officer - CIO) or an Interim Authority to Operate (IATO) may be issued for 
use of the system for a limited time while identified security weaknesses are addressed. 
Anti-Tamper (AT) Certification 
Statutory/Regulatory AT Requirement 
Anti-Tamper (AT) involves activities to prevent and/or delay exploitation of 
critical technologies in U.S. weapon systems. These activities involve the entire life-cycle 
of systems acquisition, including research, design, development, implementation, and 
testing of AT measures. To prevent unapproved technology transfer, alteration of system 
competency, or countermeasure development, program protection may require anti-
tamper capabilities, which are a derivative of the security engineering process. The AT 
process is addressed under DoDI 5000.2, DoDI 5200.39, and AT Guideline Version 2 
(the guideline is mapping of DoD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation 
Process DIACAP to IA Controls) to complete and obtain an AT certification. 
NAVAIR AT Certification Process 
The SME from AIR 4.1.14 submits the AT plan and the Critical Program 
Information (CPI) Identification and Critical Analysis assessment to the Anti-Tamper 
Executive Agent (ATEA). The AT certification shall be conducted in accordance with 
ATEA. The duration and cost to obtain AT certification is dependent on Development 
Test (DT).  
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AT Waivers/Interim Approval Request 
No waivers are authorized for AT certification; but interim approvals may be 
issued by the ATEA for a limited time while the approval package is pending. 
Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) GPS Certification 
Statutory/Regulatory SAASM GPS Requirement 
DoD GPS Security Policy issued in 2006 mandates all newly fielded DoD GPS 
systems deploy SAASM-compliant Precise Positioning System (PPS) devices due to the 
need for improving GPS security. Receivers without SAASM have a higher risk of 
dropping GPS signal due to spoofing or jamming, which would result in the loss of 
precise location and increase the time required to synchronize over communications 
systems. SAASM utilizes anti-spoofing and anti-jamming measures through encryption 
and keys to protect authorized receivers from operating with false satellite signals 
generated intentionally or unintentionally by allies or enemy. Although government 
regulations require all the latest DoD GPS systems to incorporate SAASM GPS receiver 
cards to increase security of crypto keys and counteract spoofing, many federal agencies 
and military groups still employ non-SAASM GPS receivers that put them in a higher 
security risk. Since standard GPS service can be rejected at any time via tactical combats, 
such as spoofing and jamming, it will be a challenge for non-SAASM GPS receivers to 
correct the situation quickly. 
NAVAIR SAASM GPS Certification Process 
All requests for NAVAIR SAASM GPS Certification are processed and approved 
by the GPS Directorate (GPSD), including Security Approval for SAASM Host 
Application Equipment (HAE) and SAASM Design Requirements for HAE. 
SAASM GPS Waivers/Interim Approval Request 
Integrating non-SAASM GPS requires a waiver, which can be authorized by 
Assistant Secretary of Defense. However, no waiver is obtained for Security Approval for 
SAASM HAE and SAASM Design Requirements for HAE (SAASM Functionalities, 
including Extended Functions). 
Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA) 
Statutory/Regulatory CCA Requirement 
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Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA) has reformed and improved the way the Navy acquires 
and manages Information Technology (IT) resources. An approved Acquisition 
Information Assurance (IA) Strategy is mandatory for systems that are or have IT when 
determined to be Mission Critical and Mission Essential. The CIO will be responsible for 
developing, maintaining, and facilitating the implementation of a sound and integrated IT 
architecture under USC Title 40 Subtitle III and Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) Circular A-11 Appendix J {{53 United States Department of Defense 2008}}, 
{{35 United States Navy 2011}}.  
NAVAIR CCA Certification Process 
The SME from AIR 7.2.6 (CCA Center of Excellence (COE)) provides an 
executive summary, in addition to the statutory and regulatory documentation, to the 
NAVAIR CIO. The CCA Compliance Table must be populated with the Milestone 
Decision Authority (MDA) specified program governing documentation and an 
Acquisition IA Strategy. There is no test related to CCA. CCA certification for 
Acquisition Category (ACAT) III and below can be achieved in 32 days, with the cost as 
low as $6K. ACAT I & II would take an additional three (3) months due to review by the 
second echelon, for a cost of $51K.  
CCA Waivers/Interim Approval Request 
No waivers or interim approvals are authorized for CCA certifications. 
INTEROPERABILITY COMPONENTS 
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Figure 39:   Interoperability Certifications 
Interoperability Certification 
Statutory/Regulatory Interoperability Requirement 
Joint interoperability supports the U.S. Navy’s and DoD’s mission to have net-
centric systems that ensure clear communication among all military systems, thus 
enhancing the warfighter’s capabilities. In an excerpt from DoDI 5000.2, Enclosure 6, 
Paragraph 2-C-8: 
“All DoD Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs), programs on the OSD T&E 
Oversight list, post-acquisition (legacy) systems, and all programs and systems that must 
interoperate, are subject to interoperability evaluations throughout their life cycles to 
validate their ability to support mission accomplishment. For IT systems (including 
Network Security Services (NSS)) with interoperability requirements, the Joint 
Interoperability Test Command (JITC), regardless of ACAT, shall provide system 
interoperability test certification memorandums to the Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense (Acquisition and Technology) (Deputy Undersecretary of Defense 
(DUSD)(Acquisition and Technology (A&T)), the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(ASD)(NII)/Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (DoD CIO), and the 
Director, Joint Staff J-6, throughout the system life-cycle.” {{56 United States 
Department of Defense 2008}} 
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NAVAIR Interoperability Certification Process 
The JITC representative for the PMA is responsible for identifying the required 
certification level for a given stage in the development and fielding of the payload.    
With all the necessary architecture views, a limited interoperability certification can be 
obtained in two (2) to three (3) months, with full certification in an additional three (3) 
months. 
Interoperability Waivers/Interim Approval Request 
No waivers are authorized for interoperability certification. A limited 
interoperability certification may be obtained for purposes of testing and training, but full 
certification is required for an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) decision. 
Spectrum Certification 
Statutory/Regulatory Spectrum Requirement 
Assigning electromagnetic radio frequencies for a variety of defense systems such 
as satellites, radio, or radars on the ever-diminishing electromagnetic spectrum is a 
critical process. With the rapidly-changing nature of current tactics, more complex 
defense systems rely on the spectrum to acquire information superiority and guide 
advanced weapons, especially unmanned systems. To be compliant, DoD has established 
policies and guidance to obtain spectrum certification imposed through a statutory 
requirement, Title 47 U.S. Code §305, §901–904. To ensure that communication 
equipment operating within an intended environment meet standard rules, guidelines, 
regulations, and limitations, National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (NTIA) has established the Spectrum Certification Process. 
NAVAIR Spectrum Certification Process 
Spectrum certification requests shall be submitted by the SME from AIR 4.1.M.1 
to the NTIA in the Equipment Location-Certification Information Database (EL-CID) 
format. The process should take about nine (9) to 208 weeks, with the cost ranging from 
$2k to $48k, depending on certification and complexity of the systems.   
Spectrum Waivers/Interim Approval Request 
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No waivers are authorized for spectrum certifications. However, interim 
approvals may be granted with submission to the Spectrum Planning Subcommittee 
(SPS) or the local NTIA Authority for limited duration. 
Common Data Link (CDL) 
Statutory/Regulatory CDL Requirement 
H.R.1815 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 mandates all 
datalinks used by UAS shall be CDL compliant. The Act is further clarified by ASD 
Memo Dec 30 2005 Subject DoD CDL Policy, which amplifies the importance of CDL 
for UAS video Datalinks, and exempted UAS under 30 Lbs.  
CDL is a family of government-developed and -owned communication 
waveforms. Under the new Bandwidth Efficient – CDL (BE-CDL) waveforms and 
Standard CDL Rev H waveforms, users have a selection of frequency bands in which 
they may operate, including S-Band, C-Band, Ku-Band, and X-Band. The CDL family 
also utilizes a common and interoperable encryption schema that includes both Suite A 
and Suite B. The purpose of the CDL family is to reduce development and 
interoperations cost of proprietary radio systems and increase user interoperability by 
using a common communication schema. 
NAVAIR CDL Certification Process 
For the certification package it is submitted by SME from AIR 4.5 to the CDL 
executive agency. It is presented to the CDL executive agency the Systems Engineering 
Technical Review (SETR) milestone review. 
NAVAIR CDL Waivers/Interim Approval Request 
Interim CDL waivers can be obtained, if certain requirements are met and a long-
term plan to obtain CDL is developed, funded, and exercised. A CDL waiver will take 26 
to 104 weeks, if the waiver process is begun with all of the required justification 
substantiated upfront. To successfully obtain a CDL Waiver, it must be demonstrated that 
utilizing CDL would prevent the system from completing its mission. The Waiver must 
be routed to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and 
Acquisition (ASN RDA), Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information 
Integration (ASD NII), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the DoD CIO. 
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To begin this waiver process, a program should meet with their branch’s CDL Executive 
Office to determine feasibility and identify the correct stakeholders. 
COMPATIBILITY COMPONENTS 
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Figure 40:   Compatibility Certifications 
Environmental Certification 
Statutory/Regulatory Environmental Requirement 
Materials are the building blocks of an aircraft and react based upon the 
environment. They need to operate within different environments; they need to provide a 
degree of protection from the environment to survive each mission profile and the 
physical asset needs to have degree of durability. This relates directly to reliability, 
availability, maintainability, longevity and cost. This requirement is outlined in 
SECNAVINST 5000.2E and specifically states in section 6.1.5 that each ACAT I 
program shall document its corrosion prevention and control. While any program other 
than an ACAT I does not need a corrosion prevention and control plan, it is advised to aid 
in meeting regulatory requirements for example the Hexavalent Chromium DFARS 
2252.223–7008 that requires the control or elimination of the use of hexavalent 
chromium from weapons platforms. Hexavalent Chromium is primarily found in the 
coatings and materials that make up the platform, of which the performance and use are 
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found in the corrosion prevention and control plan. The corrosion prevention and control 
plan (CPC) also outlines the specific testing that will be performed as found in MIL-
STD-810. Thus, based upon the materials of construction and the environment that the air 
vehicle will see, specific tests are chosen to prove the performance and effect on the life 
cycle of the aircraft.   
Typically the Contractor shall develop and implement a Corrosion Control Plan 
(CCP) for the system using the DoD Corrosion Prevention and Control Planning 
Guidebook Spiral No. 3 of Sep 2007 (Ref Section 3.2.11) as a guide to ensure corrosion, 
wear, and erosion resistance is considered in the Contractors design of the system. The 
Contractor shall develop, utilize, and maintain a CPC Plan and shall establish, participate 
in, and support a Corrosion Prevention and Control (CPC) Advisory Team jointly with 
the Government to track the progress of CPC engineering efforts. 
NAVAIR Environmental Certification Process 
To meet the air vehicle (AV) and air worthiness requirements the materials and 
processes of protection requirements apply to both structural and non-structural materials 
and applications used for the AV. The AV environmentally-degraded properties shall 
account for exposure to any natural and induced environment reflecting authorized usage, 
storage, and maintenance throughout the service life of the AV. The AV environmentally 
degraded properties shall account for representative production processing, 
manufacturing variability, final assembly interfaces, life cycle exposure, and the supplier 
base. Specific tests from MIL-STD-810 and others are selected 
The AV and its component parts shall be finished In-Accordance-With (IAW) 
MIL-STD-7179 the environmental certification process for each air vehicle platform is 
outline in the specific Corrosion Control Plan (CCP). The CCP details the tailoring of the 
requirements of MIL-STD-810 to the system of interest by providing a rationale to 
conduct testing to meet the operational environment and materials compatibility. 
Depending on the value of the payload, mission requirements, and funding environmental 
performance tests below may be required to comply with the certification: 
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• Humidity (48hrs) 
• Salt Atmosphere (48hrs) 
• Dust Test 
• Rain Test 
• High Temperature Operational & Non-Operational 
• Internal Operational Temperature 
• Low Temperature Operational & Non-Operational 
• Temperature Change 
• Shock per MIL-STD -810G Methods for flight, launch, recovery, & 
transportation,  equipment/payload per MIL-S-901D 
• Vibration per MIL-STD-810G Methods for flight, launch, recovery & 
transportation, equipment/payload per MIL-STD-167–1A 
 Within NAVAIR, Environmental approval and enforcement is the responsibility 
of the Materials Engineering Division, (AIR-4. 3.4) and the PMA-263 Systems Engineer. 
Payloads are generally certified for shock and vibration via a certification provided by the 
Contractor, if the testing is performed at all. Since the programs are not ACAT I, they are 
not required to have a CCP and test for environmental durability thus this requirement is 
advisory for durability risks.  
Environmental Waivers/Interim Approval Request 
The environmental performance testing certification is part of the Flight 
Clearance documentation and the requirement can be waived. The agreement to waive 
these requirements for payloads is coordinated by the cognizant Corrosion Engineer and 
Senior Materials Engineer from AIR 4.3.4 Materials Engineering Division and PMA-263 
Systems Engineer with the PMA-263 management.   
Test & Evaluation (T&E) 
Statutory/Regulatory T&E Requirement 
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The test program will be managed by the AIR 5.0 T&E representative at the 
PMA. A Test Project Worksheet will be submitted to the T&E representative requesting 
testing of the desired platform, with the required objectives and timeframe. If necessary, 
the T&E representative will coordinate with the external test agency for OT&E and 
submit reports for approval to the Director of OT&E. The level of complexity of the 
required test(s) will determine the cost and duration. 
NAVAIR T&E Certification Process 
T&E is invaluable to the development and fielding of new capabilities to the 
warfighter. It is utilized to determine the technical maturity level of the system, identify 
deficiencies that need to be corrected, and provide technical risks to assist the decision-
makers. Developmental test and evaluation (DT&E) focuses on system requirements and 
the system level risk, while operational test and evaluation (OT&E) is concerned with the 
capability the system delivers to the soldier, the operational risks,  and how the system 
performs in its intended environment  (paraphrased from the DAG5000.02  enclosure 6). 
This is imposed through a statutory requirement, Department of Defense Directive 
(DoDD) 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System.   
T&E Waivers/Interim Approval Request 
OT&E is required for all major defense acquisition programs, as defined in Title 
10 USC 2340 – Major Defense Acquisition Program and thus, cannot be waived.   
Combined DT&E and OT&E is authorized when schedule and cost savings can be 
justified. This integrated test program must allow for separate evaluations from the 
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Payload Integration Checklist for PMA-263 in MS Project® Worse Case Longest 
Schedule 
Schedule for All Certifications in Checklist using RAIN Model Data for All 
Certifications 
(Start 7/23/13 end 11/22/17 approximately 4 years 4 months corresponds) 
The Payload Integration Schedule is a product of the RAIN Team Research and is a 







APPENDIX J. RAIN IPR MEETING NOTES 
 
RAIN IPR #1: 
 




Ronnie Lyliston Wayne Parsons Dr. Rama Gehris 
Bonnie Young Angel Perez Chris Ironhill 
Fred Lancaster Diana Ly Bryan Otis 
Luis Conde-Santos  Nam Tran 
   
Notes: 
 
Questions and Information (FYI’s) from Brigitte T. Kwinn 
 
The U.S. Army has tactical UAVs, have you looked at what the Army does? 
 
• We did check with the Army (PM UAS). They don’t have a documented process, 
either. 
 
What other SE processes did you consider?  Why did you select the V model instead of 
another model? 
 
• V model was selected because it’s the process of choice throughout NAVAIR and 
would be readily-accepted by our Sponsors. We did consider other models 
including the DAU waterfall model and the one from SE3100 but we like the 
‘Vee’ model better because of the explicit and linear verification connection 
between the definition and decomposition products and the integration and 
decomposition products that the ‘Vee’ model affords. 
 
You have identified system inputs and outputs; did you consider establishing input or 
output requirements? Why? 
 
• We did consider establishing input and output requirements, and we plan on doing 




Have you identified any other functions for the system? 
 
• We have not agreed on the system functional hierarchy yet. 
 
17 top level system requirements is a pretty large number, typically there are about 10 
that deal with the system inputs, system outputs, system functions, system interfaces and 
the “ilities.” 
 
• Actually, we only have four top-level system requirements: Interoperability, 
Safety, Security, and Suitability/Environmental Compatibility. 
 
The 17 are the Component-level requirements that were derived from the System-level 
requirements. 
 
• There are only two stakeholder level requirements, or four System level 
requirements (see slide 28). What is listed in the requirements research matrix 
are the component level and configuration item level requirements. 
 
FYI 2:  You can do the requirements tracing and management in CORE also, it will 
capture the same info you have in your matrix on page 33 
 
• We are using CORE®. The matrix is just for tracking research based on the 
requirements. 
 
Second Reply from Bridgette Quinn 
 
Make sure you emphasize that the Army doesn’t have a process either, this makes 
what you are doing that much more important. 
 
Your process has to fit your system and system life cycle that is why there are so 
many processes. The V is a system development process not a process for system process 
creation. That doesn’t mean you can’t use it but you must have evidence why it fits what 
you are doing. 
 
Your 4 top system level requirements are the “ilities”? You don’t have any 
capability/function requirements? What must the system do not what must the system be? 
 
You don’t have to answer this second round of questions. 





RAIN IPR #2: 
 




Benjamin Teich Wayne Parsons Vincent Tolbert 
Dr. Paul Montgomery Dr. Rama Gehris Prof. Bonnie Young 
Fred Lancaster Angel Perez Bryan Otis 
Chris Ironhill Diana Ly Nam Tran 




Clinger Cohen Act, statutory requirement, some clarification since it applies to automated 
data equipment, does it apply? 
• It(data) drives a lot of security issues. 
The DRM he thought it was out of scope specifically T&E. 
• T&E is an external interface. T&E is conducted by T&E facilities and 
organizations where PMA-263 is a customer 
Dr. Gehris: 
Is there any one system that is really worse case? Obtaining all certifications for 
example? 
• SME’s take weeks to review on the WESRB Board only meet at certain times and 
creates a backlog and the longest pole is security. 
Dr. Montgomery: 
Trying to craft a process of what is called RAIN, do you have a model of what is the 
current process? 
• Ad hoc process does not exist. 
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No process where schedule & risk trade use case certification process vectors to trade risk 
and schedule, only data in-house/ad hoc. So some use case ma take 36 months but now 
there is structure. 
Problem statement is not “what we are doing,” hearing no way to assess what we are 
doing against a variety of scenarios. 
• Process instead of method. 
• Slide 103 is sorted by work time, but both wait time and cycle time is there as 
well. 
Top title has to do with rapid integration of stuff, appears just trading off certification of 
stuff? 
Sounds like interoperability analysis. 
• All things needed to get to the warfighter get to be interoperable. 
What do you envision the product and what do you think it is? 
Sounds 3-dimensional, still don’t see the light at the end of the tunnel. 
• NAVAIR has a bunch of procedures but there isn’t a process in place for all of the 
procedures. This process organizes and maps out the requirements via architecture 
using CORE and then simulates the process of procedures in iGraphx. (Dr. Gehris 
– the project is the process, Bonnie- not a method but a process) bringing a 
process to procedures – this will be brought out up front in the report. 













































































































Figure 41:  RQ-21 (Rector 2012) 
The RQ-21A provides persistent maritime and land-based tactical Reconnaissance, 
Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) data collection and dissemination 
capabilities to the warfighters. For the United States Marine Corps (USMC), the RQ-21 
seen in Figure 41 will provide the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and subordinate 
commands (divisions and regiments) a dedicated Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) system capable of delivering intelligence products directly to the 
tactical commander in real time. For the United States Navy (USN), the RQ-21 will 
provide persistent RSTA support for tactical maneuver decisions and unit-level force 
defense/force protection for Navy ships, Marine Corps land forces, Navy Expeditionary 
Combat Command (NECC) forces and Navy Special Warfare (NSW) units. It is 
envisioned that the United States Air Force (USAF) will employ the Integrator to provide 
persistent RSTA in support of security forces, integrated base defense and convoy 
protection requirements, and meteorological survey and data analysis by weather 
personnel(Rector 2012). 
 




Figure 42:  RQ-7B (Shadow) (From 263 UAS Portfolio Brief, 2012) 
The RQ-7B UAS shown in Figure 42 provides a dedicated RSTA, Intelligence, 
Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) and Force Protection capability to USMC units. The 
RQ-7B shares the same system baseline configuration as the Army’s STUAS POR, 
commonly referred to as the Shadow UAS. 
RQ-7B UAS consists of four (4) air vehicles (each configured with an electro-
optic (EO)/infrared (IR) sensor payload with laser designator (LD) capability), launcher, 
ground control station, attrition engine, and support equipment including: power 
generation, communications equipment, automated recovery equipment, remote video 
terminals, vehicle mounted shelters, and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles 
(HMMWV). Each system is equipped with one Maintenance Section Multifunctional 
Vehicle and is supported by a Mobile Maintenance Facility (Rector 2012).  
ScanEagle 
 
Figure 43:  ScanEagle (Rector 2012) 
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The ScanEagle family of systems, including the ScanEagle shown in Figure 43, 
Night Eagle, and CRUISER UAS, provides ISR capabilities through an ISR Services 
Contract. This Contract is an interim solution to Naval Commanders’ maritime and 
littoral ISR capability gaps and pending RQ-21A Integrator Initial Operational Capability 
(IOC). ScanEagle currently provides Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) surge 
assets with an organic, tactical level ISR asset to support full spectrum operations (Rector 
2012).   
Aerosonde 4.7 G 
 
Figure 44: Aerosonde 4.7 G (Rector 2012) 
The Aerosonde 4.7 G shown in Figure 44 provides ISR capabilities through an 
ISR Services Contract. This Contract supports USMC units in support of Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the Global War on Terror (GWOT) stationed in 




Figure 45:  Arcturus (Rector 2012) 
The Arcturus UAS shown in Figure 45 was designed to provide an ISR capability 
through an ISR Services Contract. This contract supports military units in support of OEF 
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and GWOT. It is an interim solution to ISR capability gaps and pending RQ-21A 
Integrator IOC. 
RQ-12A (Wasp IV) 
 
Figure 46:  WASP IV (Rector 2012) 
The USMC Wasp Micro Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (MUAV) in Figure 46 
provides near real-time area reconnaissance required by the platoon and rifle squad. The 
system greatly reduces the ISR request-to-response timeframe, and eliminates delays or 
denials for coverage from higher headquarters due to an imbalance of UAS assets to 
requests. The system provides the small unit with still images and live video out to line-
of-sight (LOS) ranges of 5 km. Wasp provides an operational capability in the following 
areas:  remote reconnaissance and surveillance, force protection, convoy security, target 
acquisition, and battle damage assessment (Rector 2012). 
RQ-20A (PUMA) 
 
Figure 47:  RQ-20 (Puma) (Rector 2012) 
Figure 47 PUMA delivers flexibility, endurance and a payload capability 
unmatched by other systems in its vehicle class. With a wingspan of 9.2 feet, this 
lightweight, all-environment, hand-launched UAS provides aerial observation at LOS 
ranges up to 20 kilometers. The system is deployed with the USMC and USN Special 
Forces. The systems provide Route Clearance Platoons (RCP) and Combat Logistics 
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Patrols (CLP) the required ISR asset that allows them to scan an area prior to moving 
through it in order to detect Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), IED materials and 
IED emplacement teams and after clearing it to monitor for re-seeding. 
RQ-11B (Raven) 
 
Figure 48:  RQ-11B (Raven) (Rector 2012) 
Raven in Figure 48 is a small, reusable, back-packable UAS used for “over-the-
hill” reconnaissance at the company/detachment level. It is hand-launched and flies under 
manual operator control or via a pre-programmed route. It uses onboard sensors and 
communications equipment to gather and transmit live airborne video imagery, compass 
headings, and location information back to the ground control station and remove video 
terminals out to a LOS range of 10 km. The Raven enables operators to navigate, search 
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